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Introduction
This Article evaluates how well French corporate law creates a corporate
governance favorable to capital market investors. 1 French corporate gov* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Dean Joan Wexler of
Brooklyn Law School for a summer stipend that enabled me to complete this Article. I
also thank Alice Pezard of the Groupe Caisse des D~p6ts, Professors Arthur Pinto and
Norman Poser of Brooklyn Law School for their suggestions, and Jeffrey L. Kochian of
Cornell Law School (class of 1998) for his research assistance.
1. French corporate law and securities law are not separate legal topics, but are
part of the same legal code. All references to this law are to CODE DES SOC=Trts [C. SOC.]
(Paul Le Cannu ed., 14th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1997) (Fr.).
31 CORNELL INTL .J. 31 (1998)
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ernance is a timely subject because it currently has the attention of members of the French legal, business and financial communities. 2 French
legal thinkers are increasingly examining corporate governance both in
their country and in other countries to understand solutions to corporate
3
governance problems and to reflect generally on the French situation.
This Article makes three assumptions. First, the separation of management and ownership is characteristic of large corporations. Second,
there is no single, economically superior answer to the agency problem
that arises from the differences between manager and shareholder interests. Third, technological changes and the globalization of the economy
are pushing corporate governance worldwide towards a U.S.-style market
capitalism.
As to the first assumption, economists, finance theorists, and management scholars who study large public corporations have identified a central
corporate characteristic that arises from the legal and practical nature of
the corporate "personality": the general separation between the interests of
managers who operate an enterprise and shareholders who own it. Corporate governance involves designing or altering a firm's governing structure
to ensure that managers, as the shareholders' "agents," operate the firm for
4
shareholders/owners, and not for other purposes.
Corporate law creates the corporate personality and establishes legal
relationships between shareholders and managers. Thus, from an agency
perspective, the efficacy of this law can be judged by how well it both facilitates the alignment of managers' interests with those of shareholders and
addresses abuses in the relationship. Yet law is only part of corporate governance. Because a corporation exists in many domains, such as in product, service, and capital markets, other forces pressure managers to
respond to shareholders. From an agency perspective, corporate governance thus implicates many social activities and benefits from study within

2. For recent reform proposals concerning French corporate governance, see COMMISSION DES OPERATIONS DE BOURSE, 27tME RAPPORT Au PRtSIDENT DE LA RtPUBLIQUE 85-89
(1994); CONSEIL NATIONAL Du PATRONAT FRANCAIS & ASSOcIATION FRANCAISE DES
ENTREPRisEs PRIviEs, THE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF LISTED COMPANIES IN FRANCE (July 10,

1995) [hereinafter Vi~not Report] (named after Marc Vi~not, the chief executive of
SocitE G~nfral, who presided over the committee that prepared the report); PHILIPPE
MARINI, RAPPORT Au PREMIER MINISTRE SUR LA MODERNISATION Du DROIT DES Soci-ras (13
juillet 1996) (reform proposal on French corporate law) [hereinafter Marini Report]. See
generallyJAMES A. FANTo, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW (1997);

James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance and United States
Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Fanto, Transformationof
French CorporateGovernance]. See infra Conclusion.
3. See, e.g., Olivier Pastre, Le gouvernement d'entreprise: questions de methodes et
enjeux thgoriques, 31 REVUE D'ECONOMIE FINANCIPRE [R. EcON. FIN.] 15 (1994); JeanMarie Thiveaud, De la gouvernance des grandes societes: un incessant differend dans
l'espace et le temps, 31 R. ECON. FIN. 243 (1994).
4. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 308-10

(1976).

1998

Corporate Governance in France

numerous disciplines. 5 This Article focuses only on the law's contribution
to the alignment of shareholder and managerial interests.
The second assumption is that, to date, there has not been one economically superior answer to the agency problem. At any specified time, in
different countries, and even within the same country, numerous solutions
to the problem of ensuring that managers operate firms for the shareholders' benefit have been, and continue to be, employed. The success and
profitability in national and world markets of corporations based in different countries, at the very least, suggests that several approaches to aligning
management and shareholder interests have worked. 6 According to an evolutionary metaphor used in economics and legal studies, countries and
companies, like biological organisms, have adapted different corporate gov7
ernance practices to their circumstances.
If different corporate governance practices exist in corporations and
countries throughout the world and firms successfully function in their
markets despite these differences, then corporate governance must be subject to, although not entirely dictated by, cultural or situational influences.
An understanding of corporate governance in any country should identify
the cultural forces that, at a given time, push relationships between shareholders and managers in a particular direction.8 These forces include legal
doctrines which influence shareholder/manager relationships, pressures
from groups and individuals who have a stake in a particular governance
solution or structure, and a country's traditions of firm ownership.
This Article's presentation of the role of law in French corporate governance acknowledges this cultural background. Yet, like economic
destiny, corporate governance is no longer entirely under the control of any
nation state. Indeed, corporate law scholars debate whether a transformation in the world business environment has caused a "convergence" of corporate governance whereby cultural factors are losing their influence. The
industrial world is in the middle of a massive restructuring that began
around the middle of the 1970s.9 Developments in technology (particularly in communications technology) now allow economic tasks to be both
5. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Modern IndustrialRevolution, Exit, and the Fail-

ure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 830 (1993) (discussion from finance perspective); John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of CorporateGovernance and Corporate
Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1993) (discussion from public policy perspective).
6. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of CorporateGovernance,
52 J. FIN. 737, 769-73 (1997) (discussing success of different kinds of corporate
governance).

7. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency:
When do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (1996); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and
Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HAgv. L. Rev. 641 (1996).
8. See generallyJames A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-CulturalCommunication: SEC
Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign CorporateGovernance, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 119,
134-37 (1996). Culture does not determine corporate governance arrangements, but it
strongly influences them. Cf. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of
Man, J. APPLIED CoR'. FIN., Summer 1994, at 4, 10 (observing that the social exists in a
dialectic with the individual).
9. See Jensen, supra note 5, at 835-47.
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completed at lower-costs and connected where they were previously separate. This results in overcapacity, making some enterprises, and indeed
entire industries, obsolete. The technology can also lead to more flexible,
less hierarchical work environments that facilitate rapid product changes
and responses to customer needs.' 0 Other events, such as the breakdown
of the Socialist block and the reduction of trade barriers, heighten global
product market competition, which is already exacerbated by technological
and organizational change. Businesses that use technology and human
resources efficiently stand a better chance of prevailing in their product
markets.
Technological changes also create different ways to raise both capital
and invest. Investors, -whether individually or through financial
intermediaries, have increased access to investments throughout the world.
Further, because companies can raise capital in different markets, they are
no longer limited to domestic investors." The companies best able to utilize new capital-raising opportunities and financial innovations gain an
advantage over their competitors because they can pay less for capital and
use it more efficiently.' 2 For maximum financing flexibility, a company
must find ways of bringing in capital market investors. 13 Thus, as investment alternatives expand, this competition for capital market investors
often subjects companies to new, or at least increased, pressures. No one
has yet identified the corporate governance system that will best aid compa14
nies (and thus countries) to survive in these circumstances.
As a third and final assumption, this Article assumes that the above
forces are pushing corporate governance throughout the developed world
towards a market capitalism similar to what has long existed in the United
States. It argues that, at least for the past two decades, French legal policymakers have attempted to create a legal environment favorable to both market capitalism and the corporate governance that accompanies it. Such a
legal environment would seek to enhance shareholder rights and to address
the kinds of agency problems typical of this market capitalism. Further,
Anglo-American corporate finance has generally involved raising money
from capital market investors.' 5 On the basis of these notions, French
10. See A FortressAgainst Change, A Survey of Business in Europe, ECONOMIST, Nov.
23, 1996, at 3-5.
11. See generally Roy C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GLOBAL BANKING 3-15 (1997)
(describing growing internationalism in financial services).
12. See Frank H. Easterbrook, InternationalCorporateDifferences: Markets or Law?,
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1997, at 23, 27.
13. Cf. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 6, at 769. Not every company must use domestic or global capital markets. However, they should be used by world-class companies
that need a competitive advantage. Cf. Marco Pagano et al., Why Do Companies Go Public? An EmpiricalAnalysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 60-61 (1998).
14. See, e.g., RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., LAw AND FINANCE (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 729, 1981) (reviewing shareholder and creditor rights). See
also Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance,52J. FIN. 1131 (1997)
(comparing which legal systems are most favorable to market finance).
15. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND Pal.
VATE PROPERTY (Murray L. Weidenbaum & MarkJensen trans., Transaction Publishers,
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legal policy makers have borrowed laws from Anglo-American legal traditions. It is therefore sensible to review how successfully they have done
16
their work.
Part I provides the cultural and historical background of French corporate governance and an overview of the ownership structure of large
French firms. This Part explains how State influence and concentrated
ownership (whether by the State or a family) have characterized French
corporate governance. It then identifies who generally replaces the State as
its ownership of French firms declines and the implications of such ownership for Ftench corporate governance. In the ensuing Parts, the Article
examines whether French policy-makers have been successful at creating
legal solutions to the specific agency problems that arise in a corporate
governance of market capitalism.
Part II analyzes how well French corporate law provides the basic
methods whereby dispersed shareholders address their lack of control over
an enterprise: the right to information about the firm and its governance
and the related right to vote, generally through a proxy. It finds that,
although French law requires public companies to supply a considerable
amount of information to capital market investors and provides for methods to facilitate their voting, these rules are relatively new and need to be
enhanced to encourage capital market investing.
Part III considers how French law aligns the interests of shareholders
with their elected representatives in a corporation, the directors. It
observes that French law imposes a serious "duty of care" upon directors,
but the duty has not been developed in situations involving capital market
investors. Similarly, the law also prohibits directors and managers from
engaging in conflict-of-interest transactions. Yet the law could further market capitalism if it increased the corporations' disclosure obligations with
regard to both these transactions and executive compensation. This Part
also explains how monitoring by French company accountants supplements, rather than replaces, director activity on behalf of capital market
investors.
Part IV studies the related subject of whether French corporate law
enhances the directors' obligations to minority shareholders in the special,
but important, case of a change in control or restructuring. It notes that
shareholders do not receive the protection of enhanced duties by directors
or a court-supervised right of exit from the company. They do, however,
receive both a right of exit in certain change-of-control situations and evalreprinted 1991) (classic statement on U.S. corporate governance or market capitalism,

with its dispersed shareholders and strong managers).
16. See also James A. Fanto, The Role of CorporateLaw in the Adaptation of French
(forthcoming 1998) (presenting a general
Enterprises, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. argument concerning the efforts of French legal policy-makers to design a corporate law
that promotes market capitalism and thus helps French enterprises adapt to current
economic circumstances). This Article, by contrast, evaluates in detail what these policy
makers have done.
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uation of the exit price by French market authorities, which may be adequate protection for capital market investors.
This leads to Part V, which analyzes the role of French law in a central
phenomenon of market capitalism: the takeover, whether friendly or hostile. It finds that the law gives managers considerable, but not unlimited,
opportunity to defend against hostile takeovers. This law also compels
companies to give shareholders both the time and the information to consider a bid and any competing offers. Yet this Part observes that French
takeover law is generally used to eliminate capital market investors after
controlling shareholders have decided upon a transaction, not as an instrument whereby a bidder effects a change in control. It thus suggests that the
law gives too much protection to managers whose companies lack controlling shareholders when they face hostile offers.
Part VI explores the availability of shareholder suits under French law
and observes that French shareholders can engage in collective legal action
for harm done either to themselves or to the corporation. Restrictions on
these suits and uncertainty over recovery of expenses, as well as the
absence of a clearly defined shareholder plaintiffs' bar, discourage the use
of this legal right by small shareholders. This Part considers whether such
lawsuits will become more prevalent with the increase in capital market
investors and the possible "decriminalization" of French corporate law.
Finally, this Article concludes with a brief critical review of recent proposals for legal and other reform to French corporate governance and corporate law. It observes that these proposals clearly intend to promote
market capitalism in France and that, if implemented, they would be valuable for French enterprises. It suggests, however, that the proposed reforms
do not go far enough because they do not squarely confront obstacles to
market capitalism in the form of concentrated ownership and continuing
State influence on business and the law. It argues that a public French
examination of the role of law in corporate governance is needed.
I.

The Cultural Background to French Corporate Governance

Corporate governance practices are partly cultural and historical products.
In this context, culture can be defined as the conceptual framework
whereby individuals, generally of the same country, understand and mediate the pressures of the world and motivate as well as explain their actions.
As the corporation is a meaningful and purposeful human response to economic and social pressures, culture dearly informs corporate governance
practices. The relationship between owners of capital and the managers
who use it - the heart of corporate governance - is part of the response.
Law, for example, gives shareholders certain rights and responsibilities as
to the corporation, their fellow owners, and sometimes nonshareholder citizens. Members of the culture understand what it means to be a shareholder in these terms, and this understanding motivates the actions of both
shareholders and their agents.
These observations are not new to anthropologists and cultural his-
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torians. 17 Under the influence of a biological evolutionary model,1 8 some
economists and legal scholars have also suggested that the existence and
endurance of such phenomena as corporate governance require a historical
explanation.1 9 An economic discussion should take precedence in any
analysis of corporate governance practices because these human creations
are central in a country's economic life and because it is important to
understand the cost-minimizing purposes of the practices. 20 That discussion, however, can be complemented by cultural and historical explanations that account for the endurance of certain features of these practices.
An authoritative account of Western corporate governance marks the
emergence of the corporation as the dominant form of business organization in the nineteenth century. 21 According to this account, technological
developments made possible the accomplishment of large, complex economic tasks, such as the construction and operation of national railroads.
Firms needed to grow significantly in order to attain the size necessary to
use these technologies and to accomplish efficiently the tasks in national,
as opposed to local, markets. Since technologies and related business practices worked successfully in many areas of economic life, small businesses
increasingly ceded the field to large businesses as the latter could integrate
many production and distribution functions into single firms in a costeffective manner.
These developments brought specialization to the large corporation,
and separated ownership from control. The increased size of enterprises
demanded more capital than local financing or even retained earnings
could generally provide. Firms often had to turn to outside investors, who
were dispersed throughout the nation and beyond its borders and who
22
would not necessarily commit all their funds to any single investment.
Since any one investor generally provided a small proportion of the total
capital of an enterprise, he or she did not have the same involvement in the
business, nor the incentive to monitor its employees as had an owner of a
smaller business. The new technologies, moreover, demanded specialized
management training and expertise to ensure the efficient operation of a
17. See, e.g.,

CLIFFORD GmEETz, AFTER THE FACT: Two COUNTRIES, FOUR DECADES, ONE

43 (1995).
18. See, e.g., STEPHENJAY GOULD,
HISTORY 19-26 (1980).
ANTHROPOLOGIST

THE PANDA'S THUMB: MoRE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL

19. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

3-10 (1990); Gilson, supra note 7, at 331-34; Roe, supra note 7, at

643-46.
20. See

OLiVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANcE 233 (1996).
21. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, SCAE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM 2-13 (1990); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND:
THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 1-12 (1977) [hereinafter CHANDLER, VISIBLE HAND].

22. Dispersed investors could only invest in large enterprises if a capital market
infrastructure and/or financial intermediaries existed to move their funds efficiently to
the firms. This infrastructure also permitted investors, in Professor Gilson's words, to
"specialize in risk bearing," i.e., to diversify their investments over numerous large enterprises in order to reduce the firm-specific risks of their portfolio. See Gilson, supranote
7, at 331.
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complex enterprise. A new professional management class appeared, with
all of the features that characterized professional expertise, such as professional schools and organizations. 23 The new large firm thus separated
ownership from control, a situation distinct from the traditional overlap
between the two functions in smaller firms.
In the United States, the separation was acute and had certain consequences for owners. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means observed some
sixty years ago that, as a result of the separation, the general rule that a
business was governed for its owners was not necessarily the case for a
large corporation. 24 Managers could operate large corporations for significant periods of time for their own benefit and without particular concern
about dispersed shareholders who could rarely mobilize to challenge or
replace them.25 The rise of the corporation and the separation of ownership and control in large firms also occurred in Western European countries, including France. This occurred even though the smaller size of
these countries' markets initially limited the impact of the scientific and
management technologies in creating large enterprises there. 2 6 Nonetheless, while specialization in investment and management functions
occurred outside the United States, it did not necessarily lead to the opposition between powerful managers and powerless shareholders characteristic of U.S. corporations.
In his authoritative account of U.S. corporate governance, Professor
Mark Roe explains that U.S. cultural forces helped maintain the separation
between corporate ownership and control. 27 In his view, as the examples
of corporate governance in other countries demonstrate, financial institutions could address this separation and bridge the gap. A financial institution could make a large equity investment in a corporation and thereby act
23. On the professionalization of engineers and business managers, see generally
BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFEssIONALIsM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1978); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE
RISE OF PROFEsSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977).

24. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 15, at 78-82.
25. Thus, a serious corporate governance problem developed, the disenfranchisement of the owner:
In examining the break up of the old concept that was property and the old
unity that was private enterprise, it is therefore evident that we are dealing not
only with distinct but often with opposing groups, ownership on the one side,
control on the other - a control which tends to move further and further away
from ownership and ultimately to lie in the hands of the management itself, a
management capable of perpetuating its own position. The concentration of
economic power separate from ownership has, in fact, created economic
empires, and has delivered these empires into the hands of a new form of absolutism, relegating "owners" to the position of those who supply the means
whereby the new princes may exercise their power.
Id. at 116.
26. See CHANDLER, VISIBLE HAND, supra note 21, at 499 ("Smaller and slower growing

domestic markets in Western Europe and Japan lessened the interest of manufacturers
in adopting new mass production techniques and also reduced the incentive to build
large marketing and purchasing organizations.").
27. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 26-49 (1994).
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as a financial intermediary for smaller investors. Its significant stake in an
enterprise would give it the incentive to monitor management closely, and
it could thus act as a counterweight to management's power. 28 However,
the U.S. cultural forces of populism and federalism shaped U.S. law to keep
29
financial institutions from assuming a role in corporate governance.
A similar cultural-economic story explains French corporate governance. 30 A brief outline, based upon accounts by economists, historians,
and legal scholars of French business and business law,3 1 might proceed as
follows. Separation of ownership from control arising from the modern
large firm and the specialization of management appeared in French firms
before the 1940s. Yet, for a number of reasons, it was not until after World
War II that this enterprise structure began to produce the large verticallyintegrated firm with mass-produced, consumer-oriented or technologically
sophisticated goods, numerous diversified product lines, and a coordination among operating divisions that was similar to firms in other developed economies. Even then, this kind of firm did not dominate the French
economy.3 2 Firms operated originally in a small, primarily rural market
and only gradually grew to a size that could efficiently use management
expertise. While mergers and the funding of large projects facilitated the
growth of large firms in other countries, the weakness of French capital
33
markets and the small size of banks hindered the growth of French firms.

French business growth came not within hierarchically organized firms,
but through projects funded and owned by different groups of industrial
firms with financing capabilities. 34 Furthermore, family ownership in
France did not evolve into manager-dominated firms, and the development
28. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and
Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 90-99 (1996) (questioning whether financial institutions are
beneficial monitors of management for other shareholders).
29. See RoE, supra note 27, at 53-145. To take only one example, from an early date
U.S. commercial banks (i.e., those that make commercial loans and take demand deposits) were not allowed to own shares in industrial companies, were prohibited from
expanding nationally, could not join together in expansive holding company systems,
and were separated from investment banks.
30. On non-U.S. corporate governance systems, see, for example, RoE, supranote 27,
at 169-86; Macey & Miller, supra note 28. Like most U.S. scholars, however, Roe, Macey,
and Miller focus on German and Japanese corporate governance. See Fanto, supra note
8, at 120 n.4 (listing citations); Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascinationwith ComparativeCorporateGovernance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 367 n.1 (1996) (listing citations).
The volume of work by scholars in countries outside the United States is starting to
grow. See, e.g., THEODOR BAUMS ET AL., INSTrrUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GoVERNANcE (1994) (surveying corporate governance in numerous countries).
31. For a brief comparative history of French corporate law, see Claude DucoulouxFavard, L'histoire des grandessocietes en Allemagne, en Franceet en Italie, 44 RevuE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT COMPARt

[R.I.D.C.] 849 (1992).

32. See Maurice Lvy-Leboyer, The Large Corporationin Modern France, in MANAGERiAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ETERPRISE 117 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Herman Daems eds., 1980) [hereinafter MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES].

33. See id. at 124, 146.

34. See id. at 139-45.
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of projects and expansion of firms often resulted from family relationships. 3 5 In fact, technologically competent managers - who in other countries took control of companies - often worked in France under the
supervision of family owners. Because managers generally received their
education and professional training in the State bureaucracy, they often
relied upon State contracts and aid and never developed the marketing
36
skills that might have led them to create large consumer-oriented firms.
One distinguishing feature of French corporate governance's solution
to the management agency problems of large firms was the role of the
French State. Since the seventeenth century, the State has been involved in,
and has directly or indirectly owned, large economic undertakings.
Although there have been periods of classically liberal markets with private
ownership of major enterprises in France, 3 7 the State's influence was still
felt in both these firms and the economy in general. The dconomie mixte of
the post-war years with its State ownership and control, either direct or
through financial institutions, was the most recent example of the State's
38
traditional corporate governance role.
From the agency perspective, in State-oriented corporate governance,
management was subject to the oversight of a powerful shareholder. Using
methods available to a controlling shareholder, as well as special ownership rights arising under nationalization laws, the French State kept management in check for much of the post-war period; because of its direct or
indirect controlling interest in a company, it appointed managers and
directors and replaced them by decree. 3 9 State representatives also had the
legal right to oversee and inspect the operations of a firm. The State's
influence additionally arose from the identity of corporate agents: managers and directors were typically former State bureaucrats who, by background and training, shared the State's goals and were inclined to favor
40
State purposes.
State ownership and control evolved during the post-war period from
dominance of companies to "relational" investing: 4 1 the State made capital
investments in nationalized companies available to private investors, and
35. See Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Control and Executive Compensation in
Large French Companies, 24J.L. & Soc'Y 85, 88 (1997); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Herman Daems, Introduction, in MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES, supra note 32, at 1, 7.
36. See LUvy-Leboyer, supra note 32, at 132-37.
37. See William N. Goetzmann & Philippe Jorion, A Century of Global Stock Markets 19 (Dec. 1996) (unpublished paper, on file with author) (showing data on French
stock market going back at least until 1921).
38. See JEAN-FRANCOIs ECK, HiSTOIRE DE L'EcONOMIE FRANCAISE DEPUIS 1945, at 4-39
(1994); Fanto, Transformation of French CorporationGovernance, supra note 2, at 28-40.
39. See generallyJEAN KERNINON, Las CADRES JURIDIQUES DE L'EcONOMIE MixrE 73-81
(1992). In some cases, a business enterprise would simply become part of a French
State department or ministry.
40. See generally MICHEL BAUER, LES 200: COMMENT DEVIENT-ON UN GRAND PATRON?
123-97 (1987) (describing State path to executive success).
41. See Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1009, 1010 (1994) ("Relationship investing may be described as a large longterm financial commitment by an investor to a portfolio company in exchange for a say
as to how it is run.") (footnote omitted).
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gave management more freedom to pursue business strategies with State
approval of long-term goals and intervention only in the event additional
capital was needed or problems developed. The French "Statist" corporate
governance was highly successful as the economic results of the three
decades following World War II ("Les Trente Annees Glorieuses") demonstrated. Collaborating with the State, managers exercised their business
expertise to produce "national champions" that, in many cases, competed
successfully in the world markets.
Today, in all but several "sensitive" economic sectors, the State's ownership and control of private companies are diminishing. In France, as
elsewhere in Europe and around the world, there has been a loss of confidence in the State's competence to manage enterprises in the new global
market. 42 The State often operated a profit-making business for purposes
unrelated to the specific financial well-being of the firm, such as to address
unemployment, distribution of credit, and public services. This approach
worked when France was reconstructing and modernizing its war-torn
economy and when its markets were highly regulated and dosed. In contrast, it can be argued that the approach does not work when private companies must compete in international markets and rapidly adapt to new
technologies. 4 3 With its market liberalism, its goal of reducing European
trade barriers, State subsidies of industry and budget deficits, the European Union has also pressured the State to sell off its interests in enterprises. Privatization of State-owned companies took place between 1986
and 1988, resumed in 1993, and despite occasional delays, shows no sign
of ending. 44
What will constitute corporate governance in large French companies
once the State's influence declines? To answer that question, it is useful
first to explain the importance of these companies in the French economy
42. See, e.g., John Vickers & Vincent Wright, The Politics of IndustrialPrivatisationin
Western Europe: An Overview, in THE POLITICS OF PRIVATISATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 1, 6
Uohn Vickers & Vincent Wright eds., 1989); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 6, at 767-69.
43. This statement oversimplifies a complex matter. Firm success depends upon the
goals that are set for it, the definition of such goals and the monitoring of those
entrusted with achieving the goals. Under this definition, state-owned firms could be
said to have achieved success - it all depends upon their goals. In certain situations,
they might be the most appropriate for achieving specific goals. See Saul Estrin &
Virginie Pfrotin, Does Ownership Always Matter?, 9 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 55, 58-64 (1991).
See also WILLIAMSON, supra note 20, at 241 ("Whether public ordering can do better
depends on whether (i) the public sector is better informed about externalities, (ii) the
requisite collective action is easier to orchestrate through the public sector (possibly by
fiat), and/or (iii) the social net benefit calculus differs from the private in sufficient
degree to warrant a different result.").
44. See Fanto, Transformationof French CorporateGovernance, supra note 2, at 49-56.
Just recently a Socialist government has again taken power in France. At first it stated
that it might well bring the French privatization program to a halt. See Badfor Business?,
ECONOMIST, June 7, 1997, at 51. Recent signs reveal, however, that the new government
has no choice but to continue privatization in some form if it wants to comply with
European Union restrictions on state support of firms and its guidelines on reducing
state budget deficits, See France Still Trapped, ECONOMISr, July 5, 1997, at 51.
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and to provide current information concerning their capital and ownership
structure.
Stock market capitalization of French companies 45 accounts for
approximately 32% of France's gross domestic product, 46 reflecting the

significant role that large companies play in the French economy.
Although it is not possible to obtain an exact understanding of the capital
structure of listed companies, available data suggest that nonfinancial
industrial companies have decreased their debt financing, increased their
47
funding from equity capital, and retained earnings over the last ten years.
Like U.S. companies, French companies secure approximately 30-40% of
their capital from equity and retained earnings. 48 'Numerous factors,

including high interest rates (which discourage continued debt financing),
increased emphasis on privatization, and improvement in4 9French stock
markets, have influenced this increase in equity financing.
Stock ownership in these large firms is concentrated, but not in the
hands of financial institutions. Of the 120 listed nonfinancial companies
in an index of the Societ des Bourses Frangaises, the weighted average
percentage holding of the five largest shareholders was 48.2% in 1995.50
Other data suggest that, out of the 416 largest French firms in 1995/1996,
24% of the identifiable stockholders in these firms had holdings of more
than 50% in a given firm, with 16.5% of the stockholders having holdings
larger than 75%.51 Depending on the data source, financial institutions 45. Listing on France's "first market" (La Cote officielle) requires that at least 25% of
the company's share capital be held by the public and that the company have three years
of published financial accounts (the last two of which must have been audited), See
CMF Rlglement G~n~ral, arts. 3-1-11, 3-1-14, C. soc., supra note 1, at 913. French market authorities demand that the share capital of a listed company be substantial. See
HUBERT DE VAUPLANE &JEAN-PIERRE BoRNEr, DROIT DE LA BOURSE 350 (1994).
46. This is out of a GDP of FF 7,681 billion. See OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: FRANCE
1997, at 166 (1997) [hereinafter OECD FRANCE]. This represents a significant shift from
the 20% figure of approximately ten years ago (1986). See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International
Data, 50J. FIN. 1421, 1448 (1995).
47. Rajan and Zingales do note that, from 1982 to 1991, French companies
decreased their leverage. Further, from 1984 to 1991, the external financing of French
companies was primarily equity, although as a fraction of total financing it was a relatively small amount. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 46, at 1432, 1439. In contrast,
financial companies, such as banks, generally have a highly leveraged financial
structure.
48. See OECD FRANCE, supra note 46, at 123-25 (French non-financial companies
have 36.2% of their capital structure in equity (share capital and retained earnings) in
comparison to 37.4% for U.S. companies). Looking at data primarily from 1987 to
1991 and attempting to be more restrictive in their definition of debt, Rajan and Zingales
find that companies in the G-7 countries have similar leverage (with the exception of
companies in Germany and the U.K. which have lower leverage). See Rajan & Zingales,
supra note 46, at 1438. This result cautions against a ready characterization of countries
with relatively small capital markets as necessarily having more leveraged companies.
49. See OECD FRANCE, supra note 46, at 124-25.
50. See id. at 113. This number can be contrasted with comparable U.S. figures of
25.4%. See id.
51. See Paul Windolf, The Governance Structure of Large French Corporations: A
Comparative Perspective 17-19 (March 1997) (manuscript on file with author). Profes-
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such as banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds - own approximately 20-37% of the equity capital in listed companies, but due to legal
controls, these holdings are generally not controlling positions.5 2 Another
significant class of shareholders is French nonfinancial companies, which
also own approximately 20% of the listed companies and whose holdings
are more concentrated than those of financial institutions. 53 Households
own 34% of listed companies, and of these, wealthy individuals and families have significant stakes. 54 Foreigners own approximately 20% of listed
French firms.5 5 Since large French companies are currently seeking equity
capital, both French investors and non-French investors are becoming critical as capital providers.
The question is whether the State's declining ownership really signifies its abandonment of its customary corporate governance role. Statistics
show that the State is no longer mediating, and given the trend toward
liberalized markets, cannot mediate, this investment. As the recent French
parliamentary elections show, many French citizens continue to turn to the
State as a problem solver. French history of a centralized State and social
acceptance of concentrated financial power, for example, differs from the
U.S. populist preference for local centers of power and fear of centralized
financial institutions. Moreover, the State retains the possibility of influsor Windolf's data suggest that 63% (262 firms) of the large French firms in his sample
have a majority shareholder, and 87% (373 firms) have one shareholder with a holding
greater than 25% (in the United States, this figure is approximately 4% (9 firms)). Id.
52. For the general breakdown, see Andrea Goldstein, Privatizationsand Corporate
Governance in France, 48 BNL Q. REv. 455, 475 (1996) (chart based upon 1994 data
prepared by OECD). See also OECD FRA~ca, supranote 46, at 111. Professor Windolfs
data produce slightly different results: banks own 20.2% of the 416 largest French
firms, insurance companies own 12.1%, and funds own 5.2%. His database may be
more restricted than that of the OECD. These institutions do not generally have controlling positions. Together, they are controlling shareholders in only 48 out of 416 companies in his database. See Windolf, supra note 51, at 19. The limited control position of
French financial institutions is related to legal obstacles that keep their holdings at the
noncontrolling level (e.g., banks are generally limited to holding 10% of any nonfinancial company, insurance companies and mutual funds are limited to a 5% holding). See
Goldstein, supra, at 477.
53. See Goldstein, supra note 52, at 475; OECD F-ANcE, supra note 46, at 111. Of
the 262 companies in his database with a majority shareholder, approximately 59 have a
French industrial company as such a shareholder. See Windolf, supra note 51, at 19.
54. Goldstein's data indicate that households (including ownership through financial intermediaries) own 34% of listed company stock. See Goldstein, supra note 52, at
475. See also OECD FRANCE, supra note 46, at 111. In Professor Windolf's database,
direct individual and family ownership (which does not include ownership through
financial intermediaries) is 12.8%. Moreover, individuals and families have controlling
positions (greater than 50% stakes) in 29 companies, and significant stakes (between
10% and 49%) in 56 others. See Windolf, supra note 51, at 19. Professor Windolf feels
that his database in fact understates family ownership, since many shares are held by
nonfinancial companies where the actual ultimate owner is unknown. See id. at 18 n.25.
55. See Goldstein, supra note 52, at 475; OECD FRANcE, supra note 46, at 111. Professor Windolf's data show that some foreign shareholdings are concentrated (e.g., of
the 180 firms with a 75% shareholder, 40% (72 firms) had a non-financial foreign firm
in this position, which suggests that the firm is a subsidiary of a foreign firm). See
Windolf, supra note 51, at 19. See also Alcouffe & Alcouffe, supra note 35, at 89 (giving
a similar breakdown of ownership of the largest French companies).
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ence in some privatized firms. 5 6 In firms where it no longer has, or never
had, direct or indirect ownership, its influence may be exercised through
other means, such as the awarding of contracts and through managers still
largely originating from the State bureaucracy. 5 7 Thus, it is hard to imagine France without State influence over the policies of major French
enterprises.
Yet with the State abandoning, or at least reducing, its corporate governance role, will other institutions fill its place as a strong counterpart to
French management? As noted above, an account of corporate governance
in large French enterprises should not ignore the importance of family
ownership. 5 8 Windolf and Bauer argue that family ownership has been an
enduring and dynamic form of capitalism in France, and not merely a
stage on the road to an inevitable capitalism of dispersed shareholders and
strong managers. Even in recent years, families continue to own and control, often through complex pyramids of ownership, some of the most profitable large French companies. 59 Families could replace the State's
ownership role in large firms because their ownership has always existed
side-by-side with that of the State. Since families both cultivate from within
and recruit managers from the State career path, they are not passive owners and present yet another solution to agency problems in the French
corporation.
Financial institutions could also assume a new corporate governance
role in France.60 On a practical level, banks and insurance companies
could act as vehicles for small investors, either by managing specific equity
investments or by investing the proceeds of deposits. Further, a strong single investor, such as a bank, may be more welcome in France, where historically the State and single family ownership of firms has dominated. In
fact, many French observers hold that despite the withdrawal of the State
from capital investment, this characteristic of French corporate governance, the acceptance of centralized financial power, distinguishes it from a
classic Anglo-American market capitalism and may favor creating a role for
56. See generally Alice Pezard, The Golden Share of Privatized Companies, 21 BROOK. J.
L. 85 (1995) (describing the "golden share" used, for example, in the privatization
of the Soci~t Nationale d'Elf Acquitaine, which gives the State a veto on major transactions involving Elf). The actual State shareholding of listed firms is not significant (2%
of listed firms), but such figures do not necessarily reflect indirect State ownership and
influence. See Goldstein, supra note 52, at 475; OECD FRANCE, supra note 46, at 111,
118-22. Professor Windolf's data suggest that the State still controls (greater than 50%
shareholding) 32 of the 416 largest French firms. See Windolf, supra note 51, at 19.
57. See BAUER, supra note 40, at 170-91. See also Goldstein, supra note 52, at 479.
58. See BAUER, supra note 40, at 51-120; Windolf, supra note 51, at 15-16. See also
Morton Keller, Regulation of Large Enterprise: The United States Experience in Comparative Perspective, in MANAGERIAL HIERARctIEs, supra note 32, at 161, 164.
59. See OECD FRANCE, supra note 46, at 127 (pointing out the good results of familyowned companies, such as LVMH, L'Oreal, Carrefour, Castorama). See also Alcouffe &
Alcouffe, supra note 35, at 90 (noting that French family groups have proved to be
dynamically efficient because, with centralized control, they can respond rapidly to
changes in markets and technology, but that such control is often incompatible with
rights of minority shareholders).
60. See OLIVIER PASTR8, LEs NouvEAux PILIERS DE LA FINANCE 101-31 (1992).
INT'L

1998

Corporate Governance in France

financial institutions in corporate governance. 6 1 Those hostile to market
capitalism particularly prefer the emergence of a capitalism of strong
financial intermediaries. 6 2 Use of financial institutions to regulate agency
problems may thus be one of the most favored solutions to France's corporate governance problems.
The monitoring of financial institutions is not without practical and
theoretical difficulties, however, some of which are specific to France.
Although bank-centered corporate governance appeared preferable to U.S.
governance during the early 1990s, 63 problems are now appearing in the
main models of this form, prevalent in Germany and Japan. Bank-centered
corporate governance is suited to temporary economic circumstances
(such as reconstruction), closed national markets, and preferences for debt
financing. It may not, however, be well adapted to present economic
64
conditions.
Of further relevance, France has no tradition or experience with financial institution capitalism. As explained above, the shareholding percentage of financial institutions has been insignificant due to legal constraints,
and their role has generally been one of financier and advisor to a strong
shareholder, such as a family or the State.6 5 Moreover, from the perspective of controlling management, the possible involvement of financial institutions in corporate governance has a dark side.6 6 Fran~ois Morin has
drawn attention to the creation, at the time of privatization, of the noyaux
durs or cross-shareholdings of companies structurally "centered" around a
financial institution (or group of such institutions). In these instances,
financial institutions provide companies with financial and restructuring
advice. However, since no financial or industrial shareholder controls
another company in the network, cross-shareholding protects the managers
of each networked company from capital market pressures. 67 This "capi61. See, e.g., Olivier Pastr6, Les dix commandments du gouvernement d'entreprise,in
L'ARGET DANS LE MONDE 1996, at 201, 203 (1996) [hereinafter RAPPORT MORAL] ("Quatriime commandment: tu assumeras la specificite du capitalisme a
la frangaise.").
62. See, e.g., MiCHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME cormE CAPITAUSME 117-92 (1991).
63. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. &
CORP. CHANGE 277, 297-313 (1996) (summarizing scholarly work favoring bank-centered capitalism). See also Rock, supra note 30, at 375-86.
64. Market capitalism is making inroads, albeit slowly, in both countries. See, e.g.,
Making Companies Efficient: The Year Downsizing Grew Up, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1996,
at 97-99.
65. See OECD FRANCE, supra note 46, at 111, 125; Windolf, supra note 51, at 16.
Credit Lyonnais was the one French example of a bank with significant equity stakes,
but its spectacular failure has cast doubt in France on the wisdom of this form of corporate governance. See Goldstein, supra note 52, at 475-76.
66. Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of RelationalInvesting, 15 Canozo L.
REv. 987 (1994).
67. See FRANCois MORIN & CLAUDE Dupuy, LE COEUR FINANCIER EUROPLEN 47-54
(1993). See also Frangois Morin, Le rtgle capitaliste entre laxisme et detournement, in
RAPPORT MORAL, supra note 61, at 207, 210-11. The Vi~not Report offers the view of the
cross-shareholdings often heard in French business circles, i.e., it is a temporary phenomenon that will disappear when French companies can raise capital from other
French sources (pension funds, once they are created, and other financial institutions
RAPPORT MORAL SUR
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talism i lafran~aise"produces and maintains a management oligarchy, for
managers are subject to no countervailing power. It may also allow the
State to influence industrial policy covertly through friendly managers and
indirectly to protect national industries against foreign "invaders." Yet if
financial institution monitoring takes this form, where institutions favor
rather than check management control, capital market investors will suffer
and French companies with such ownership structures will feel product
68
market discipline too late.

Yet another French corporate governance outcome could be possible, a
market capitalism that also has French cultural origins. 69 As noted above,
for maximum financing in global competition, French world class companies need to attract capital market investors whose investment presumes a
liquid and well-regulated stock market and non-French investors who also
make significant investments in these companies and favor market capitalism.70 Since, moreover, the State can no longer fulfill the retirement
demands of an aging population and still meet European Union budget
restrictions, there is a need for private pension funds, which must make
equity investments to maximize their returns. 7 1 On the basis of an AngloSaxon model, these funds apparently prefer a shareholder and marketbased corporate governance system and, because of their mobility, will
penalize countries and companies producing less than adequate returns.
French persons and organizations, particularly the Commission des Oprations de Bourse, 72 are also pushing for a market capitalism solution and
emphasizing the development of French capital markets and the availability of those markets to foreign, as well as domestic, investors.
French corporate law will play a role in determining the French corporate governance "outcome." 73 For example, corporate law of the post-war
years had a "Statist" character that both reflected and promoted the State's
that have not traditionally invested in equity). See Vidnot Report, supra note 2, at 14 ("In
this respect, the existence of cross-shareholders may be viewed as a transitional phenom-

enon in French capitalism, and one whose elimination as quickly as possible would
appear highly desirable.").

68. See generally Frangois Morin, Privatisationet devolution des pouvoirs: Le modtle

fran~ais du gouvernement d'entreprise, RtvUE

ECONOMIQUE

1253, 1263-66 (1996). As

Jensen observes, product market discipline is inevitable. When it strikes, it may destroy
an enterprise, with great human cost. It is thus useful to have other management control
systems that would permit a more rational and productive transformation of an enter-

prise. See Jensen, supra note 5, at 850-51. French privatized companies have recently
been the least profitable of large French firms. See OECD FRANCE, supra note 46, at 12526.
69. See WLLIAM JAMES ADAMS, RESTRUCTURING THE FRENcH EcoNO!MY: GOVERNMENT
RIsE OF MARKET COMPETITION SINCE WORLD WAR II 249-54 (1989) (describing
the historical strength of economic liberalism in France). See also Keller, supra note 58,
AND THE

at 164.
70. See generally Fanto, Transformationof French CorporateGovernance, supra note 2,
at 22-28; Jean-Paul Valuet, Fonds de pension americains: incidences de leur politique
d'actionnariatsur les societes francaises,in BOURSE ET PRODUITS FINANCIERS (1996).
71. See CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLIcY STUDIES, WORKING PARTY REPORT No. 12, CORPoRATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 29-30 (1995).
72. See COMM'N DES OPERATIONS DE BOURSE, supra note 2, at 85-89.
73. See generally Fanto, supra note 16.
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control of enterprises. The concept of the intdrft social, which permeates
the French corporate code, permits directors to consider the interests of all
constituencies in deciding upon corporate strategy. 74 This concept
allowed the State-owner to use controlled corporations for purposes other
than profit-making. For the past two decades, however, French legal policymakers have changed corporate law to make it more hospitable to capital
market investors. Part II examines whether they have achieved their goals.
II. Information and Voting
If market capitalism separates shareholder ownership from management
control, corporate law should help shareholders to monitor and discipline
managers. A main monitoring method is shareholder voting, whereby
shareholders elect, or reelect, the agents who oversee the corporation's
operation and approve decisions by these agents on major corporate
actions. In order for such monitoring to be meaningful and effective, shareholders must have information. In fact, control of management is based
upon shareholder access to, and expertise in understanding, corporate
information. As Robert Clark explains in his classic hornbook on corpoinspection right is to insure
rate law, "[t]he basic reason for a shareholder
75
managerial accountability to shareholders."
A. French Shareholders' Legal Rights to Information
Professor Conard once observed that U.S. state corporate law rules on the
provision of information to shareholders were "rudimentary" compared to
those of many other industrialized countries, including France. 76 Under
the basic French corporate law governing public companies, the socigt6
anonyme, the shareholder has the right to see a significant amount of information. A shareholder can inspect, at the company's main place of business, minutes of the shareholder meetings, a list of those present, and
documents prepared prior to the company's annual shareholder meeting
for the last three years. Among other things, the documents include the
company's financial statements, a list of directors, any reports by the directors or by the statutory auditors (les commissaires aux comptes), any expla-

nation of resolutions submitted at the meeting, together with background
information on the candidates for board membership, and total compensation to directors. 77 A shareholder can also obtain the company's certificate
78
of incorporation (les statuts) and a list of directors and statutory auditors.
79
Directors who prevent this disclosure are subject to criminal sanctions.
74. See Vi~not Report, supra note 2, at 5.
75. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 103 (1986).
76. See ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPEcTIVE 325-27 (1976).
77. See Loi N2 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966, [1966] JO 26 juilet 6402, arts. 168-170

(Fr.), C. soc., supra note 1, at 114, 328-30 [hereinafter Loi N2 66-537]. See also MICHEL
DROIT DES SOCItrIs 104 (2d ed. 1992). See infra Part IV. Section C.
78. See D~cret N2 67-236 du 23 mars 1967, [1967] JO 24 mars 2843, art. 153 (Fr.),
C. soc., supra note 1, at 599, 641 [hereinafter Dhcret N2 67-236].
79. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 445, C. soc., supra note 1, at 569-70.
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A shareholder of a French company has the absolute right to undertake, without justification, an inspection of records and to have the information ready for his or her perusal. It is unclear, however, how effectively
a shareholder can use the inspection right to identify other shareholders in
order to encourage them collectively to oppose or replace managers. In his
recent proposal to reform French corporate law, Senator Marini suggests
that the law should be amended to compel a company to give a requesting
shareholder all the information it has about shareholders' identities (not
just the few names actually registered on the company's books). This proposal indicates that problems exist under the current disclosure laws. 80
Shareholder information rights under French corporate law are thus likely
to be more useful to shareholders in a closely-held corporation or to large
shareholders in a large public corporation (for example, a family owner)
than to capital market investors. Such limited utility is perhaps explained
by the fact that these laws originated in a time when firms were controlled
by the State or a family unit. While a shareholder in a closely-held corporation or a large shareholder may use these rights to safeguard its ownership
stake and to contest other shareholder factions, it is difficult to imagine
that a capital market investor, with minor holdings in a company, would
have the necessary economic incentive to exercise these informational
rights. 8 1
The most important legal means whereby capital market investors
acquire information about publicly-traded firms is through mandatory disclosure. While only recently developed and not as extensive as that
required of companies under U.S. law and regulation, such disclosure has
gradually developed in France. The addition of this safeguard suggests
that French legal policy makers are incrementally creating a legal climate
favorable to capital market investing. That before 1967 securities regulation was not an identifiable area of French law, and that no specialized
government regulator existed to ensure the flow of accurate information to
capital market investors, underscores the historical insignificance of such
investors in French corporate governance as compared to other shareholders (such as the State, financial institutions and controlling families).
Since that time, the major government market regulator, the Commission
des Operations de Bourse (the COB) has gradually grown in power and
size, particularly due to laws passed in 1988 and 1989.82 Two other mar80. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 89-90. See also Philippe Merle, Les controles
internes, in LA MODERNISATION Du DROIT DES SOCIfrIS: PREMIRES RFLEX1ONS SUR LE RAPPORT MARNI 41, 42 (Jean-Jacques Daigre ed., 1996) [hereinafter MODERNISATION DU
DROI] (agreeing that there are problems with access to shareholder lists in French
companies).
81. In France, small shareholders can act collectively through shareholder associations, but this is a recent legal power. See generally Loi N2 66-537 (as amended by Loi N2
94-679 du 8 aofit 1994), C. soc., supra note 1, at 114-599.
82. Two major legal reforms, the Loi N2 88-70 du 22janvier 1988 and the Loi N2 89531 du 2 aofit 1989, significantly increased the oversight, investigatory and enforcement
powers of the COB with respect to disclosure and market manipulation. See THiERRY
SCHOEN, THE FRENCH STOCK EXCHANGE: A PRACTIcAL GUIDE FOR INVESTORS AND ADvIsORS
4-10 (1995); Michel Germain, Les socitds quifont appel public a l'epargne,in MODERNISA-
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ket authorities succeeded earlier self-regulatory organizations and complement the COB's oversight of the securities markets by regulating market
participants in the stock exchanges (for example, brokers and listed companies) and exchange issues. The Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs,
renamed the Conseil des March s Financiers (CMF) 8 3 in 1996, and the
Socit5 des Bourses Frangaises (SBF) were established in 1988 and progressively acquired powers in matters such as broker regulation, listing
procedures, and tender offers. 84 Shareholder disclosure improved with the
increased power of these French market authorities.
The initial public sale of securities in France, which exemplifies the
cooperation of these market authorities, requires the disclosure of information in a prospectus (note d'information)that, pursuant to COB regulations,
includes business, financial, and offering information.8 5 Without COB
approval, the company can use neither the prospectus nor the summary
prospectus that is disseminated to the public to generate interest in the
securities. The listing of securities, which generally accompanies or precedes their issuance, also involves considerable disclosure. Under the
direction of the CMF, the SBF prepares a dossier of historical, financial, and
business information supplied by the company. 86 The listing is subject to
COB veto. 87 French listings also require the company to continue to provide exchange authorities with interim financial results as well as information about corporate events which substantially affect the company and its
shareholders. 88
Yet French mandatory disclosure, while increasingly comprehensive,
may not fully promote capital market financing. The COB believes that
more progress is needed with what is called "continuous reporting" in the
United States. The COB has observed that, while information flows to
investors from several sources in French companies, it is not well-organized. The investor or the market professional8 9 has no single company document detailing the overall business, financial situation and governance of
supra note 80, at 31, 32 (pointing out that the COB's regulations constitute another corporate law for listed companies); Leslie Goldman, The Modernization of
the French Securities Markets: Making the EEC Connection, 60 FoRDHAm L. REv. S227,
S237-S245 (1992).
83. See Loi N2 96-597 du 2 juillet 1996, [1996] JO 4 juillet 10063 (Fr.), C. soc.,
supra note 1, at 1047-49.
84. See generally CMF R-glement G~nral, C. soc., supra note 1, at 911-46.
TION DU DROIT,

85. See COB R~glement N2 91-02, C. soc., supra note 1, at 957-59 (Fr.); ScHOEN,

supra note 82, at 149-56.
86. See ArrAt du 6 juillet 1988, art. 3-1-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 911.
87. See ScHoEN, supra note 82, at 156.
88. See Arrfti du 6 juillet 1988, art. 3-1-2, C. soc., supra note 1, at 911-12.
89. Evidence suggests that the French securities markets are efficient. See WilliamJ.
Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of Foreign Security Trading and U.S.
Competitiveness, J. APPLiED CoRP. FIN., Winter 1993, at 19, 25-27. Thus, investors rely
upon market price, which is established by the activity of market professionals (e.g.,
doing fundamental analysis about companies and trading on their research). See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 557 (1984).
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a French company. 90 To remedy this informational gap, the COB thus
encourages companies to file with it a document de ref~rence based on the
annual report customarily prepared for shareholders at the annual meeting. 91 The COB recognizes the capital market investor as an increasingly
important figure in French corporate finance, which is not surprising
because, without such investors, the COB would have little purpose for its
existence.
B. Shareholder Voting
Since voting is one of the few legal methods whereby the shareholder can
directly influence the policies of the corporation, a significant corporate
governance concern is focused on which subjects a shareholder of a large
corporation is permitted to vote. The corporate form takes advantage of
centralized and specialized management, which must be free to operate the
business to effectuate the purpose of a corporate form. As a result, the
subjects of shareholder voting are limited, with the most important being
the election of directors. French corporate law is generally in line with the
laws of other countries in allowing shareholders to vote on only a few subjects. At meetings, whether ordinary or extraordinary, French shareholders
vote only on major decisions affecting an enterprise (election of directors,
92
changes to its certificate of incorporation, and mergers).
The highly regulated French voting procedures ensure that shareholder voting is not an empty formality. 93 Some aspects of the French law
on shareholder voting, however, suggest that, until recently, the system was
designed to regulate the relations between management and a small group
of concentrated owners, rather than management's relations with numerous shareholders. These aspects have led some scholars to conclude that
the French legal tradition is not favorable to capital market investors. 9 4 In
the United States, for example, capital market shareholders are protected
through the practice of "one share, one vote," that is, all common or "ordinary" shares have equal voting rights. 95 In contrast, French corporate law
90.
(1993)
91.
92.

See COMMISSION DES OPERATIONS DE BOURSE, 2 6tME RAPPORT Au PRESIDENT 44
(discussing lack of such company document).
See COMMISSION DES OPERATIONS DE BOURSE, supra note 2, at 23.
See Loi N2 66-537, arts. 153-157, C. soc., supra note 1, at 309-15.

93. See Loi N2 66-537, arts. 160-177-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 319.
94. See LA PORTA, supra note 14, at 18-20.
95. State corporate law enables a corporation to be structured by classes of shares,
each with differing voting and economic rights. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a)
(1996). However, the SEC and the major U.S. stock exchange, the New York Stock
Exchange (the latter through its rules), traditionally opposed the use of "dual-class" common stock, where some shareholders have no or fewer voting rights, in large publiclyowned companies. The dual-class issue surfaced in U.S. corporate governance in the
1980s when management sought in some cases to recapitalize their companies' capital
structure with dual-class stock so as to maintain control in the face of the threat of

hostile takeovers. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996). While the
story of the SEC's opposition to dual-class stock is an interesting one, see RicHARaD W.
JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 714-716 (1992) (summa-

rizing the story), it suffices to say that, while shares with unequal voting rights are not
prohibited in the United States, whether they arise from dual-class stock or some other
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allows a company to grant a shareholder double voting rights if he or she
holds shares in registered (as opposed to bearer) form for at least two
years. This legal possibility does not seem particularly well-suited to, and
may even harm, capital market investors who buy and sell shares frequently and who are more likely to hold shares through financial
96
intermediaries rather than directly with the company.
Capital market shareholders' weakness arises from their number, geographical dispersion, and small holdings. Such characteristics make it
unlikely that they will act as a cohesive group at shareholders' meetings. In
fact, there is little economic incentive for them to attend meetings at all, or
even to vote, so long as they can easily sell their shares. 97 To facilitate
shareholder participation in the corporate enterprise, corporate law should
allow a shareholder to vote by proxy, that is, to instruct another individual
to cast his or her votes on particular resolutions or in director elections.
Yet French regulation akin to full proxy voting is of relatively recent origin.
Under French law, a shareholder could always give his or her vote to a
spouse or another shareholder, or simply provide a "blank" power to management.9 8 Only in 1983 did French corporate law allow a shareholder to
vote by mail (par correspondance), and it was not until 1988 that detailed
rules were instituted regulating the manner of, and management's conduct
regarding, this kind of voting. 9 9
The relatively recent origin of this French proxy-like regulation and
the "relative lack of use" of the French proxy process again suggest that
capital market investors are only gradually becoming significant in French
corporate finance. If major French companies increasingly seek equity
capital from these investors in the national and global market, more legal
and regulatory attention must be given to this process. Recent use of proxy
solicitation by shareholder activists in the Eurotunnel context suggests that
French shareholders are discovering the advantages of organizing themselves through proxies.10 0 Capital market investors may also become more
assertive and begin to oppose current French corporate voting practices,
such as the double voting privilege1 0 1 and the ability of a company to limit
attribute (such as the length of shareholding), they are the exception, rather than the
rule.
96. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 175, C. soc., supra note 1, at 334-35. See also infra note

224 and accompanying text (describing principle of "one share, one vote" in France).
97. This is the classic collective action problem. SeeJA.Es D. Cox Er A., Com'oRA-

TIONS

335-36 (1997).

98. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 161, C. soc., supra note 1, at 321-22; MAURICE CozAN &
AtLaN VIANDIER, DROIT DES Socit.vs 310 (9th ed. 1996). A single shareholder can thus
obtain the proxies of many fellow shareholders.

99. See Loi N2 83-1 du 3 janvier 1983, [1983] JO 4 janvier 162, art. 161-1 (Fr.), C.

soc., supra note 1, at 323; D~cret N2 67-236, art. 131-1 to 131-34, C. soc., supra note 1,

at 632 (as amended by D~cret N2 86-584 du 14 mars 1986 and DEcret N2 88-55 du 19
janvier 1988).
100. SeeJoel Chernoff, ShareholderPower Grows: France'sFirst Proxy SolicitationsAre
Big Step Forward,PENS. & INv.,June 10, 1996, at 19 (this technique was designed by the
U.S.-trained shareholder activist, Sophie L'Hlias).
101. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 175, C. soc., supra note 1, at 334-35. See also infra note
223-24 and accompanying text.
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the number of votes a shareholder can cast at a shareholders' meeting, 10 2
which, in the circumstances of market capitalism, help protect management from collective shareholder action. 10 3
Senator Marini recommends making the French proxy process more
responsive to and more protective of capital market shareholders. He suggests one reform, based on a Swiss model, that would involve appointing
an independent official (a mandataireinddpendant) for shareholders' meetings, to whom capital market investors could send their "blank" powers
and who would be more inclined than management to act on their
behalf.10 4 He also suggests facilitating the formation of shareholder
associations to enhance the ability of small shareholders to act collectively
in their shareholder and investor organizations.10 5 In addition, inspired by
U.S. law on pension voting, 10 6 Senator Marini recommends that French
institutional investors, such as mutual funds and private pension funds, be
legally obligated to vote and to explain to their clients their voting
10 7
policies.

102. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 177. See also infra note 215 and accompanying text.
103. See Loi N2 78-741 du 13 juillet 1978, [1978] JO 14 juillet 2799, art. 177, C. soc.,
supra note 1, at 726-28 (Fr.). In effect, the legal ability to put a ceiling on voting by any
single shareholder suggests that French corporate governance is changing (i.e., that
there is no longer a controlling shareholder, like the State, in a company's capital. If

there were such a shareholder, no protective ceiling would be necessary). Further, it
shows that French company managers are afraid of the outcome of this transformation
(i.e., they want the protection from takeovers that the ceiling gives them when there is no
dominant shareholder).
In addition, French law allows a company to require that shares other than those
registered on a company's books be "immobilized" for five days up to the date of the
meeting, if a shareholder holding such shares wants to vote. See D~cret N2 67-236, art.
136, C. soc., supra note 1, at 636. This process deters market capitalism, since capital
market investors may well be reluctant to immobilize their shares for even a short
period. See LA PORTA, supra note 14, at 19.
104. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 92.
105. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (recommending that these organizations include bearer, as
well as registered, shareholders).
106. See, e.g., Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare Administration Interpretive
Bulletin, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860 (1994) (stating that fiduciaries of private pension plans
have responsibility to vote proxies of shares held by the plan).
107. See id. at 99. See also Jean-Paul Valuet, L'identificationdes actionnairesdes socidtds
cotees, RIvuE DEs Socitr.s, oct.-dc. 1996, at 707, 725-28. The article discusses legal
problems that may hinder voting in French companies by nonresident shareholders and
the need for a solution since these shareholders are increasingly likely to exercise their
voting rights. It further proposes that financial intermediaries be allowed to transmit
the vote of shareholders, if these intermediaries receive the permission of shareholders
and disclose their intermediary status to the issuer. See id. In commenting upon the
Marini Report, Professor Merle suggests that more emphasis should be placed on the
better use of voting par correspondence, rather than on new methods of shareholder voting. He also cautions against pushing French institutional investors to vote before
installing safeguards to prevent their abuse of the vote. See Merle, supra note 80, at 4547. The French legislature has recently passed a law authorizing the creation of private
pension plans. See generally Plan epargne retraite: Mode d'emploi, LE PoINT, Mar. 15,
1997, at 81-86.
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Directors and Other Supervisors of Managers

Directors are of critical importance in the corporate governance of publicly-owned firms. Elected by shareholders, they are expected to represent
shareholder interests, even if their primary obligation runs to the legal
"personality" of the corporation. Although they do not manage the corporation's operations, directors are supposed to "direct," or to supervise, its
business. A corporate director thus occupies the ideal middle position
between management and shareholders. He or she can generally supervise
the former on behalf of the shareholders. Further, even if he or she cannot
pay the same amount of attention as management to the business, it is at
least more attention than the owners themselves can give. Directors often
have considerable business experience, making them well-suited to this
role. As a corporate structural matter, therefore, the directors could
address the agency problems presented by market capitalism.
In practice, however, the director in France has often been a corporate
governance disappointment. A typical director does not necessarily have
the same interests as shareholders and also is not directly answerable to
them (again, the director's primary responsibility is to the corporation). In
fact, the director is much more likely to be a representative of management
than of shareholders. Managers, not shareholders (except shareholders
contesting management), have the main say in nominating directors, and
thus directors are beholden to management for their position. Directors
frequently come from management ranks (the chief executive of a French
company is also its chairman of the board) or former management. They
may also be business executives at other companies, who, on account of
their own positions, are sympathetic to management's desire to run a company without interference. Lastly, directors may be in occupations whose
business success may depend upon management's good graces, such as
investment banking, law, or business consultation, that provide services to
1 08
a corporation.
Even if directors were focused upon protecting shareholder interests
against managerial overreaching, they are at a disadvantage for logistical
reasons. Corporate boards act only at meetings and since, except in a "crisis," meetings occur infrequently, directors (who generally have other fulltime positions) do not have much time to supervise management. It is also
questionable whether this meeting time, as well as the necessarily limited
premeeting preparation, is adequate to enable them to comprehend the
complex business of a large public company. Directors have a right to
information about the corporation. The information, however, generally
108. General research on boards of directors suggests that the director's background,
as well as other social factors, such as group behavior and loyalty, conspire to ensure
that boards are deferential to management and passive in protecting shareholder rights.
See generally ADA DEMB & F.-FRiEDRICH NEuBAUER, THE CORPORATE BOARD: CONFRONTING
TE PARADOXES (1992); JAY W. LoRsCH & ELIzABETH McIvER, PAWNS AND POTENTATES:
THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989). The French situation is more acute

since chief executives in large French companies have almost dictatorial powers. See
infra Part IV.A.
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comes not from an independent directorial staff, but from management,
which can therefore control its content and presentation.' 0 9
Much corporate legal (and other) scholarship in the last three decades
suggests ways to minimize the passivity of boards of directors functioning
in market capitalism and to make boards more responsive to shareholder
interests. One reform, which has now become a reality in many AngloAmerican jurisdictions, mandates that the majority of directors be
"outside" directors, individuals not drawn from management. 1 10 This
reform has not proved to be a panacea because it fails to deal with the
indirect influence of managers on directors and the issues of directors' lack
of time and expertise. Another suggestion is to have "professional" directors, whose full-time job would be to direct several companies and who
could thus develop expertise in monitoring company management."'
Furthermore, to help insulate outside directors from management influence, the chairperson of the "supervisory board" could be required to be an
outsider as well. 112 Current research also identifies the importance of
tying board compensation to company share performance, thus linking the
interests of board members and shareholders more closely. 1 13 While legal
and nonlegal efforts to make corporate directors more effective monitors
for shareholders continue, 1 14 basic corporate law addresses the agency
problem by imposing upon directors specific duties and establishing guidelines by which directors can satisfy these legal obligations.
A. The General Obligations of a Director
By setting standards for director conduct, French corporate law attempts to
ensure that directors (administrateurs)will take their positions seriously
and thus monitor management for the benefit of shareholders. As a prelim109. The Vi~not Report recognizes these problems with board operation, although it
does not consider that they require changes to French corporate law. For example, it
observes that French company boards "meet three to four times a year, and in practice
meetings last around two hours." See Vi~not Report, supra note 2, at 16. It also recognizes that directors receive information about the company only from management. See
id. at 17.
110. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCIE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 110-14 (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (discussing recommendation from a group of legal practitioners and scholars that corporate boards in
large public companies should consist of a majority of outside directors).
111. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for InstitutionalShareholders, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991). See also Laura Lin,
The Effectiveness of Outside Directorsas a CorporateGovernance Mechanism: Theories and
Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 898 (1996).
112. See 1 PRINCIPLES, supra note 110, at 115-33 (discussing the function and composition of audit, nominating and compensation committees). See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN &
JOHN C. COFFEE,JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCI-

PLES 151-52 (1996).

113. See Charles M. Elson, ShareholdingDirectors Create Better CorporatePerformance,
ISSUE ALERT, May 1996, at 3 (describing report of the National Association of Corporate
Directors' Commission on Director Compensation). See generally Romano, supra note
63, at 284-97.
114. For a discussion of the impact of this research on reforming French boards, see

infra Conclusion.
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inary matter, it is useful to explain French corporate board structure.
Although there are two possible legal structures,' 1 5 the following summary
concerns only the form that is widely used. Under French law, a board of
directors or "conseil d'administration," elected by shareholders, "administers" the affairs of the French societe anonyme.1 6 The law gives the conseil
broad powers to act on the company's behalf.11 7 It elects from its members
a president, who "is responsible for general management of the company,"
who acts for the company with respect to third parties, and who can essentially exercise all powers not reserved to the shareholders or to the
board.'1 8 The actual direction and operation of a company thus lie in the
president's hands, subject to the board's supervision. The board can also
grant the president the ability to appoint one or more individuals, known
as directeurs gtnraux, to assist him in company management." 9 These
"directors" work with non-directeur executives and the president, who is
himself a general director and goes by the title of "president directeurgentral"or the "PDG." The PDG thus has considerable statutory powers and is
20
perceived to be all powerful in his company.'
A director's responsibility to the corporation (and thus to the shareholders) is stated in the French corporate code and explained in the related
jurisprudence. In particular, the code provides that, "The directors are
responsible individually or as a group, depending upon the situation, to
the company or third parties, for (1) violations of laws or regulations applicable to corporations, (2) violations of the certificate of incorporation, and
(3) errors committed in the course of management."'12 1 Shareholders cannot relieve directors of this responsibility by ratifying an action or decision
115. French law provides for two board structures: a board of directors (conseil
d'administration)which selects one of its members as the chairman and chief executive
(presidentdirecteur general or "PDG"), see Loi N2 66-537, art. 89-117, C. soc., supra note
1, at 230-90, and a supervisory board (conseil de surveillance),which names an executive
board (le directoire) and selects a president thereof, see id. art. 118-150, C. soc., supra
note 1, at 290-308. The second structure, which is infrequently used in France, is
modeled on the German system. See CLAUDE DUCOULOUX-FAvARD, Soctirr ANONYmE,
AKIEN GasELLscHAwr, SocimTA PER AZIoN 120-29 (1992).
116. Loi N2 66-537, art. 89, C. soc., supra note 1, at 230.
117. Loi N2 66-537, art. 98, C. soc., supra note 1, at 250-57 (from Loi N2 67-559 du
12 juillet 1967 and Ordinance Loi N2 69-1176 du 20 d&cembre 1969) (Fr.) ("Le conseil
d'administration est investi des pouvoirs les plus etendus pour agir en toute circonstance au nom de la socit6; il les exerce dans la limite de l'objet social et sous r6serve de
ceux express~ment attribuis par la loi aux assemblees d'actionnaires.").
118. Loi N2 66-537, art. 113, C. soc., supra note 1, at 281-84 (from Loi N2 67-559 du
12 juillet 1967).
119. See Loi N - 66-537, art. 115, C. soc., supra note 1, at 285-87.
120. See Ducouloux-Favard, supra note 31, at 872 (describing how the PDG structure
during the Vichy regime was based upon German corporate law). As Senator Marini has
observed, French corporate law gives the PDG and the board almost equal power. In
some cases, managers of large French companies now use this power unchecked by
State oversight, the former means of internal control. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at
8-9, 39-40.
121. Loi N2 66-537, art. 244, C. soc., supra note 1, at 408-11 (from Loi N2 67-559 du
12 juillet 1967) (translation by author). As the late Professor Jeantin remarked, "company directors (managers or a board of directors (or a supervisory board) of a corporadon) have a positive obligation to act, under all circumstances, in the company's
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of the directors which is allegedly in violation of their duties. 12 2
The closest of the above three "duties" to a basic "duty of care" is the
last obligation of directors - to avoid any "fautes commises dans leur gestion." 123 The French corporate code, however, fails to define this concept.
In his treatise, Professor Gibirila explains that a director is expected to act
as a prudent, diligent and active person would in similar circumstances
(that is, as a corporate director would act), and that he or she cannot use
lack of experience or knowledge as an excuse. 12 4 He admits that this faute
is difficult to establish with precision, particularly for acts of administrateurs, as opposed to proving the misconduct of directeurs who are
actively engaged in business management. He also acknowledges that
French courts apply the doctrine on a case-by-case basis. 125 Directors
must take an active interest in the enterprise and scrutinize the actions of
the PDG and the other directeursgdngraux. An important part of their gestion is to ensure that they have adequate information about the business
12 6
and the PDG's conduct thereof.
The liability imposed upon a director if a company becomes bankrupt
exemplifies the seriousness with which French law treats a director's obligation to supervise company management. Under French bankruptcy law,
a director is personally liable if there are insufficient assets to cover creditors' claims, if he or she committed a faute de gestion, and if the faute "contributed" to the deficiency. 12 7 In this context, too, the statutory law fails to
define what constitutes a faute de gestion. Case law suggests, however, that
a director may be liable even on the basis of simple negligence. 128
Although it is difficult to prove director error and many reported cases deal
with gross nonfeasance or malfeasance,' 29 this legal obligation and penalty
reinforce the supervisory responsibilities of a French company director. 130
At first glance, the French legal "duty of care" is puzzling from a corporate governance perspective. One might predict that there is no developed
duty in French corporate law, because the duty would seem to go hand in
hand with the protection of capital market investors. Yet the opposite is
interest. If they fail to do this, their responsibility is engaged." See JEANrIN, supra note
77, at 134-35.
122. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 246, C. soc., supra note 1, at 413 ("Aucune d6cision de
l'assembke g6nerale ne peut avoir pour effet d'6teindre une action en responsabilitt
contre les administrateurs pour faute commise dans l'accomplissement de leur
mandat.").
123. Id. art. 244, C. soc., supra note 1, at 408-11. Professor Gibirila admits that the
obligation of a director to avoid the faute de gestion sometimes overlaps with his other
duties (i.e., to avoid breaking the law and committing a violation des statuts). See DEEN
GIBIRI.A, LE DIRIGEAMrr DE SOCIrTl: STATUTJURIDIQUE, SocIAL ET FiscAL 439 (1995).
124. See GIBIPILA, supra note 123, at 430, 439.
125. See id. at 439-40.
126. See id. at 441.
127. See Loi N2 85-98 du 25 janvier 1985, [1985] JO 26 janvier 1097, art. 180, C.
soc., supra note 1, at 794, 812-19 (Fr.).
128. See GIBIRULA, supra note 123, at 479.
129. See id. at 480.
130. Directors are also subject to considerable criminal penalties for abuse of their
functions. See id. at 540-64.
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true: the duty to avoid fautes de gestion is at least as severe as any "duty of
care" in the Anglo-American legal context. 13 1 A duty of care does not, in
fact, implicate only a corporate governance of capital market investors. A
legal obligation like the duty of care is useful in every corporate situation,
because, by definition, the corporate form involves a delegation of responsibility to those who manage property that they do not own. After all, the
foundation of the duty of care, as with other corporate duties, lies in basic
agency law. One should thus expect to see the duty wherever the corporate
form exists. In economic terms, a general, open-ended obligation imposed
upon directors, like the duty of care, is the most cost-efficient manner of
monitoring their behavior for long periods of time in unforeseeable
circumstances.

13 2

The use or enforcement of the duty, not its existence, makes the difference. In a country like the United States where market capitalism has a
long history, the duty has been refined to protect capital market investors
during different events that involve public companies, (including proxy
contests, mergers, and hostile takeovers), without deterring management
from making business decisions. In France, the duty has not similarly
developed because controlling shareholders, like the State and families,
had other means to police and direct management. The French duty of
care will become an important protection for French and non-French capital market investors as these investors begin to play a larger role in the
capitalization of French companies. 133 In fact, both the Vi~not Report and
the Marini Report urge French directors to take their basic duty of care
more seriously. 134 Given the attention this duty has attracted from French
legal policy makers, it may soon assume a more important role in French
corporate governance.
B. A French Director's Duty of Loyalty
Since the corporate form uses agents and thus implicates an inevitable conflict of interest between agents and principals, directors owe a duty of loy131. Under Delaware law, for example, the duty of care requires that a director not be
grossly negligent and that he or she act reasonably under the circumstances of the director's position (e.g., size of the corporation). See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985). A director's compliance with the duty of care often turns on whether
the director adequately informed himself and debated with his peers before taking
action (generally before voting for a resolution proposed by management). The American Law Institute (ALI) further qualifies the definition of the duty of care, by specifically
stating that it "includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made, an inquiry when,
but only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable director or officer to the need
therefor." 1 PRINCIPLES, supra note 110, §4.01(a)(1) at 138-39.
132. See FRANK H. EASTERBRooK & DAImL R. FIScHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucTuRE op
CoRPoRATE LAw 91 (1991).
133. In both the United States and France, directors are under an obligation to obey
the law and the corporate certificate or articles of incorporation. These obligations,
while important, are at the outer bounds of corporate governance, governing only egregious management abuse.
134. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 4243; Viknot Report, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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alty to, or a duty to deal fairly with, the corporation. 13 5 Officers and

directors of large public corporations with capital market investors should
bear this obligation because they control the property of shareholders who
cannot individually monitor their agents' behavior, and thus managers
have the opportunity to engage in opportunistic behavior at shareholders'
expense. 136 For example, a director or officer may directly or indirectly do
business with the corporation on terms which are personally beneficial but
are not favorable to the corporation. This may take the form of extraordinarily high executive or director compensation, personal use of corporate
property, or use of corporate information for his or her benefit.137 Since
disclosure discourages self-serving management actions, disclosure obligations help to prevent these abuses in large public companies.
Similarly, French corporate law imposes upon managers and directors
a duty of loyalty and regulates their conflicts of interest. As a general matter, it limits the number of comparable positions that an officer or director
may occupy, although the limitations are not particularly restrictive. No
individual can be a member of more than eight boards of directors of
socidtes anonymes in France, 138 nor can he or she occupy the position of
13 9
PDG in more than two companies.

French conflict of interest rules also reach management and director
self-interested transactions. Subject to certain exceptions, French law prohibits a director or an executive (and any of their relatives) from borrowing
money, or receiving a guaranty, from his or her corporation.' 40 This rule
not only protects shareholders and creditors from an improper use of corporate funds, but stands upon a moral ground. It prevents improper management and director behavior that may injure a corporation's reputation
135. The ALl uses the term "duty of fair dealing" to emphasize the obligation of
officers, directors and control persons to avoid conflicts of pecuniary interest with the
corporation. See 1 PRINCIPLES, supra note 110, at 199-200.

136. Some academic literature criticizes the imposition of this duty upon managers.
The reasoning is that, if managers divert wealth from shareholders through conflict of
interest transactions, shareholders can simply reduce management compensation
accordingly. Other scholars believe that management's diverting wealth to itself hurts
shareholders. For a summary of the debate, see LucIAN AYRE BEBCHUK & CHRISTINE
JoLTs, MANAGERIAL VALUE DIvERsION AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH 1-3 (Harvard Law School

John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 179,
1996).
137. See CLARx, supra note 75, at 141-46.
138. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 92, C. soc., supranote 1, at 236. This restriction excludes
board positions that a natural person occupies as a representative of a company, and up
to five additional positions in companies that are at least 20% owned by a company in
which one is already a board member. Id.
139. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 111, C. soc., supra note 1, at 280. Senator Marini proposes restricting this cumul des mandats so that the eight board membership restriction
would include board positions which are now exempted from it and that a PDG would
be restricted to four board positions (not counting his board seat in the company and
membership on boards of its subsidiaries). See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 45. His
reason for this recommendation, however, is not to address conflicts of interest, but to
"upgrade" the quality of French board members and executives.
140. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 106, C. soc., supra note 1, at 270-71.
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and thus its ability to raise capital. 14 1 In the event of a violation, the company can either declare the contract void or seek damages from the offending officer or director. 14 2 In addition, this misfeasance subjects a director
or manager to criminal sanctions for improper use of corporate property,
particularly the crime of abus de biens sociaux.143
French law does not prohibit all transactions between a director or
officer and a corporation; it simply subjects them to a prior approval process. Other than contracts in the ordinary course of a corporation's business, 14 4 the following contracts must be preapproved by a specific
procedure: those between a director or executive and his or her corporation; those between the corporation and another corporation or business in
which he or she is an owner, director or executive; and those between the
corporation and someone with whom the director or executive is directly or
indirectly linked. 145 This rule applies to any special compensation for
members of the board of directors, other than directors' fees (the jetons de
presence),14 6 but does not apply to the board's determination of compensation for the PDG. 14 7 French law broadly defines the kinds of contracts
subject to this preapproval procedure so that it covers any agreement,
whether written or oral, that might allow directors or executives to benefit
148
at the company's detriment.
Under the approval procedure, 149 the "interested" director or officer
must inform the board of directors about the conflict of interest, that is, the
141. See GIBIRILA, supra note 123, at 382.

142. Id.
143. See Loi Ns 66-537, art. 437, C. soc., supra note 1, at 556-65, translated in COM167-68 (1971).

MERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., FRENCH LAW ON COMMERCIAL COMPANIEs

The president, the administrators,or the general managers of a corporation who,
acting in bad faith, use the corporation's property or credit in a manner which
they know to be contrary to the interests of the corporation, for personal ends,
or for the benefit of another company or enterprise in which they have a direct
or indirect interest, will be punished by imprisonment from one to five years
and/or receive a fine of 2,000 to 2,500,000 Francs.

Id.
144. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 102, C. soc., supra note 1, at 263-65.
145. Article 101 of the Loi N2 66-537 provides that:
Toute convention intervenant entre une soci&t et 'un de ses administrateurs ou
directeurs g~n~raux doit Etre soumise A 'autorisation pr~alable du conseil
d'administration.
I1en est de meme des conventions auxquelles un administrateur ou directeur
g~n&ral est indirectement interksse ou dans lesquelles il traite avec la socidtE par

personne interpose.
Sont 6galement soumises Oautorisation pr~alable, les conventions intervenant
entre une sociWt et une entreprise, si l'un des administrateurs on directeurs
g~n&aux de la societi est propri~taire, associ6 ind~finiment responsable, g~rant, administrateur, directeur gnral ou membre du directoire ou du conseil de
surveillance de l'entreprise.
Loi N2 66-537, art. 101, C. soc., supra note 1, at 259-63.
146. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 109, C. soc., supra note 1, at 272. Thejetons are simply
compensation paid to directors for their attendance at board meetings. See id. art. 108.
147. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
148. See generally GIBIRIIA, supra note 123, at 389-90.
149. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 103, C. soc., supra note 1, at 265-66.
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transaction, contract, or both in which he or she has a direct or indirect

interest. The entire board (not a board committee), acting without the voting participation of any interested director (who neither counts toward the
board quorum nor can vote), must authorize the transaction by a specific
decision after receiving adequate information about the transaction and
deliberating formally on its merits. Once the board approves the transaction, it can proceed.15 0 The PDG must inform the company's statutory
auditors (les commissaires aux comptes) about the transaction. Prior to the

next annual shareholders' meeting, the auditors must prepare for the shareholders a report on this transaction, as well as on any other similar transactions, including those that the statutory auditors may have discovered and
those that did not receive the board's disinterested pre-authorization. At
the annual meeting, shareholders are asked to approve the transaction.
Failure to obtain shareholder approval, however, does not render the contract void, but may lead to liability of the interested director, and possibly
the board, for any damages suffered by the corporation because the contract was not approved (for example, if the contract or transaction were
15 1
contingent upon shareholder approval).
Fraud nullifies an "interested" contract. Even in the absence of fraud,
the contract is void if the board of directors did not pre-approve it, provided
that the corporation suffered damages as a result.' 5 2 A shareholder vote at
a general meeting can ratify the contract if shareholders approve it after
receiving a special report by the statutory auditors explaining why the
board failed to follow the proper pre-approval procedures. As noted above,
a violation of the duty of loyalty by a director or officer can also give rise to
criminal liability.' 5 3 Fraudulent use or appropriation of corporate assets
can lead to such a penalty, as can the intentional use of corporate goods or
credit for a director or executive's personal ends or for his or her other
business, if detrimental to the corporation (the classic abus de biens
sociaux). 5 4 Similarly, criminal liability attaches when directors or execu55
tives abuse their powers or positions for other self-interested purposes.'
Having entrusted their funds to corporate managers, French shareholders receive the legal protection that the "duty of loyalty" provides.
Managers realize that, if they do not follow the pre-approval process and
their self-dealing is detected and determined to be unfair to the corporation, the transaction will be voided and they will suffer any losses arising
from unwinding the transaction, as well as criminal liability. From a capital market perspective, these laws help ensure that shareholder funds are
not diverted to management's personal uses and that shareholders need
not impose a significant discount on a corporation's share price as com150. In certain cases, pre-approval by shareholders can substitute for board approval.
See GIBIRILA, supra note 123, at 403.
151. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 104, C. soc., supra note 1, at 266-67.
152. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 105, C. soc., supra note 1, at 267-70.
153. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
154. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 437, C. soc., supra note 1, at 556-65.
155. See id.
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pensation for the risk of management self-dealing. 156
A potentially troubling kind of self-dealing arises in management compensation. By law, the French board of directors alone determines the
compensation of its president and general director;' 57 it cannot delegate
this matter to a compensation committee, nor does this determination
come within the above approval procedure for contracts or transactions
involving a conflict of interest. Individual compensation of executives has
generally been kept secret in French companies, while the aggregate compensation figures for all executives is customarily disclosed. Further, no
detailed disclosure is required under French securities laws, even though
other systems have concluded that complete disclosure deters serious compensation abuses. Given the considerable power of the PDG over other
directors (and the likelihood that other directors, themselves often PDGs or
former executives, would support generous PDG's compensation package)
and the secrecy of compensation arrangements, the possibility for abuse
still exists in French management compensation.
Yet, in France, executive compensation has not generally been debated
or viewed as a corporate governance problem.1 58 Since the State and family owners have for some time closely supervised managers, they may well
have kept compensation within reasonable bounds. This lack of attention
to executive compensation, however, is likely to change. As the State
recedes from its influence in some large companies, the likelihood of management opportunism in compensation increases. Capital market investors (whether French or non-French) are likely to pay more attention to
how French management compensation is determined and demand more
information about individual executive compensation. Market forces alone
may effect change in this area. 1 59 In addition, the board's legal obligation
in setting compensation will likely come under increased scrutiny and
French jurisprudence in this area will be developed.
Thus, French corporate law addresses management and director selfdealing in a detailed manner. Again, this is not surprising because the
French corporate form rests upon a basic agency relationship and there is a
need in any such relationship to find an economical way of guarding
against overreaching by the agent. If anything, French corporate law may
be too strict in discouraging contracts between management and the corporation, which might arguably be beneficial to both parties, and in penaliz-

156. The duty may thus be the most efficient (i.e., least costly) way for shareholders
to monitor corporate agents. See EASrERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 132, at 90-108.
157. See Loi Ns 66-537, art. 110, C. soc., supra note 1, at 272-80.
158. See PastrE, supra note 3, at 32.
159. Because of pressure from non-French shareholders, some French executives are
"voluntarily" disclosing their compensation. In economic terms, this could be seen as
an effort by agents to "bond" with their principals, which reduces the discount that
investors would assign to a company's shares for the risk of management opportunism
on compensation. See France's Boardroom Revolution, WALL ST.J., Oct. 17, 1995, at A20
(discussing executive compensation disclosure by management at Lyonnaise des Eaux).
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ing management under criminal law for minor violations of the duty. 160 In
fact, in his proposed reform to the French corporate law, Senator Marini
suggests eliminating criminal penalties for conflict-of-interest transactions
when the interested managers and directors involved do not personally
161
benefit from a particular transaction.
In the conflicts of interest area, French law is well-suited for closelyheld corporations. Yet, in public companies, where capital market shareholders predominate, disclosure about management and directors and
their dealings with the company is necessary to discourage self-dealing.
Here, as exemplified by executive compensation, French law is not completely developed. 162 Increased disclosure on management activity and its
potential conflicts, which would deter self-dealing and act as a useful signal
of management's loyalty to shareholders, would further capital market
financing in France. If this disclosure is improved and other internal controls on management are instituted, then it will make sense to eliminate the
criminal penalties for minor violations of the duty of loyalty.
C. Monitoring Through Accounting
Shareholders must rely on other parties inside the corporation to ensure
that the corporation is being operated on their behalf.16 3 One check on
management behavior comes from an auditor or accountant. Depending
upon the circumstances of his or her employment, the auditor or accountant may be either a corporate agent or an independent professional. A
business operates for profit, and profit depends not only upon the product
or services offered, but also to some extent upon control of, and information about, expenses and revenues. Particularly, because neither executives
nor directors have the time, nor often the expertise, to do this work, and
because they need financial information to make business decisions, the
establishment of financial controls, the preparation of financial statements,
and the accountants who perform this work are significant in corporate
160. Indeed, the prevalence of criminal sanctions for violations of a duty of loyalty
goes hand in hand with the State's involvement in companies, for a violation of corporate law or a company's statuts (certificate of incorporation) implicates State interests.

See infra Part VI, Section D.
161. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 112-21. The French Court de Cassation has
recently held that criminal sanctions for an abus de biens sociaux may not lie when a
director or manager does not personally benefit from the transaction. Judgment of Feb.
6, 1997, Cass. Crim., 1997 Bull. Crim. (Fr.) at *20-*21, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
library, Frprcs file (holding that a bribe paid indirectly by a company president to a
government official seeking to reduce the amount the company owed the government
did not constitute, without any more showing, a payment for the president's personal
interest).
162. Since statutory auditors report potential conflicts of interest to shareholders,
who must vote to approve them at the annual meeting, and since these conflicts are then
publicized by the financial press, deterrence may be accomplished without legal reform.
163. There are also forces outside the corporation that monitor agent behavior. These
forces, such as product and capital market pressures, are not properly the subject of an
analysis of legal corporate governance. SeeJensen, supra note 5, at 850.
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governance.
For any French company of significant size, French corporate law cre16 5
ates an official corporate governance role for accounting professionals.
These commissaires aux comptes are similar to U.S. external auditors. Elaborate rules, which govern eligibility for the position, ensure that commissaires cannot have, either directly or indirectly, any relations with
management, owners, or affiliates of the company (or their relations). In
addition, they cannot take positions in the company following the conclusion of their employment mandate. Other regulations require that commissaires be independent accounting professionals who are under the
jurisdiction of regional and national commissions, and the Cours
16 7
d'Appel. 166 Only a French court can remove the commissaires for cause.
The basic role of the commissaires is to audit a company's accounts.
This is not a one-time effort provided at the end of the fiscal year, but
rather the work extends throughout the year and involves reviewing any
prepared accounts and continually monitoring a company's internal financial control systems. 168 Whether or not they "certify" a company's
accounts, the commissaires must report on them to both the board of directors and the shareholders. The latter must vote to ratify the accounts and
can do so only after receiving the report. 16 9 The commissaires must also
verify any other company accounts, as wen as any management reports on
a company's financial situation. In accomplishing these tasks, they cannot
participate in company management and must guard their independence
from it. 17 0 The requirements that the commissaires notify the board and

shareholders of any irregularities discovered in the company's accounts
and that they alert the French public prosecutor to any serious problems
therein exemplify this independence. 1 71 Under French law, the accountants are liable to the company and to third parties for damages arising
172
from their negligence.
164. See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You
Manage What You Measure, 96 CoLuM. L. REv. 1335 (1996) (reaffirming the importance
of accounting in corporate governance).
165. See Loi N2 84-148 du ler mars 1984, [1984] JO 2 mars 751, arts. 218-35, C.
soc., supra note 1, at 374-402 (Fr.) [hereinafter Loi N2 84-148]. See generally JEATnN,

supra note 77, at 144-56.

166. See Loi N2 84-148, arts. 219, 219-1, 219-2, 219-4, C. soc., supra note 1, at 375-

77.

167. See D~cret N2 67-236, art. 188, C. soc., supra note 1, at 662 (as amended by

D~cret N2 85-295 du ler mars 1985); see also Loi N2 84-148, art. 227, C. soc., supra note
1, at 390.
168. See Loi N2 83-353 du 30 avril 1983, [1983] JO 3 mai 1356, C. soc., supranote 1,
at 1386 (Fr.); Loi N2 85-11 du 3 janvier 1985, [1985] JO 4 janvier 101, C. soc., supra
note 1, at 793-94 (Fr.); Loi N2 66-537, art. 228, C. soc., supra note 1, at 392-93.
169. See Loi N2 66-537, arts. 230, 233, C. soc., supra note 1, at 395, 398-99.
170. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 228, C. soc., supra note 1, at 392.
171. See id. For example, Article 233 provides that "they shall inform the state Prosecutor of any offenses of which they have knowledge, but they may not be held liable for
such disclosure." Id. art. 233, translatedin COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, INC., supra note
143, at 113.
172. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 234, C. soc., supra note 1, at 399-402. The commissaires
also have a duty to notify the board, and ultimately the shareholders, of any information
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The duties of the commissaires aux comptes are related to French law's
requirements on publication of financial statements. At the end of each
fiscal year, the board or managers of large French public companies must
compile, among other things, an inventory, financial statements, and a
written report. The report covers the management of the enterprise, information on current assets and liabilities, the value of shares held in the
company's investment portfolio, financial results, and plans pertaining to
financing. 1 73 Management makes this information available to the commissaires for verification prior to the shareholders' annual meeting. 174 At
mid-fiscal year, a company's board or management gives a preliminary
review of balance sheet information and pre-tax revenues, which is once
again reviewed and certified by the commissaires.17 5 Similarly, a company
must prepare a statement of its net revenue every four months, categorized
by activity and compared with preceding periods. 176 The end-of-year information is published in an official legal journal, as is the semi- and tri17 7
annual information.
The corporate governance conclusions that can be drawn from French
legal requirements on financial statement certification are similar to those
discussed in the context of directors' duties. As one would expect given the
importance of accounting in any evaluation of business results, verification
of accounts by the commissaires has long been used in France as a way of
detecting management abuse. Yet in recent years, the commissaires have
become increasingly important as amendments to French corporate law in
1984 enhanced the position of the commissaires and as greater financial
reporting obligations (subject to commissaire review) have been imposed
upon large French companies. 17 8 Such developments point to French legal
policy-makers' recognition of the increased importance of capital market
investors in France. These investors, together with the market professionals acting on their behalf, need reliable information about companies that
is "certified" by outsiders. The broad powers of continuous review given to
the commissaires and their reporting (even to parties outside the corporation) represent an attempt by French law-makers to equalize the balance of
power (if only in the information area) between management and shareholders and to push the board to take its oversight duties more seriously. 1 79 To improve further the internal controls on management of
coming to their attention indicating that the company is in financial difficulty. Loi N2
84-148, art. 29, C. soc., supra note 1, at 758. The commissaires are criminally liable for
any serious dereliction of their duties.
173. See Loi Na 66-537, art. 340, 340-1, 341-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 469-70, 47273.
174. See D~cret N2 67-236, arts. 243-44, C. soc., supra note 1, at 676-77.

175. See Dfcret N2 67-236, arts. 244-1, 297-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 677, 700-01.
176. See Dhcret N2 67-236, art. 297, C. soc., supra note 1, at 700.
177. See Dhcret N2 67-236, arts. 295-96, C. soc., supra note 1, at 699-700.
178. Much of the preceding discussion about commissairesrefers to provisions placed
in French corporate law as a result of the 1984 amendments. See, e.g., supra notes 16567 and accompanying text.
179. In addition to the commissaires, French law allows shareholders representing
10% of the capital of a corporation to petition a court to appoint an expert to review the
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French companies, Senator Marini recommends increasing the responsibility of the commissaires.1 0
While the commissaires' corporate governance role and their responsibility to detect serious management errors is important, it is ultimately
limited by the restrictions on their participation in management. They
simply cannot provide all of what dispersed capital market shareholders
often need: adequate representation in the supervision of a corporation
that can provide strategic advice to, and a strong check on, executives
before serious problems develop. As their role is currently defined, the
commissaires will not fully be able to address difficulties arising from a
separation of ownership and control in a public corporation if such difficulties become acute in France with the increase in capital market investors. While it is important to understand the corporate governance
contribution of the commissaires through accounting, they should not be
18 1
seen as a substitute for an effective board of directors.

IV.

Governance Issues Related to the Elimination of Minorities

A major transformation of the corporation's business is an important event
for both the corporation and its shareholders. Investors who have elected
to fund a particular kind of venture may not want to be equity holders in a
different enterprise. Several central legal corporate governance issues arise
in such cases: whether corporate directors conduct themselves appropriately in deciding upon the transformation, whether shareholders should
have any input in the decision, and whether shareholders who disapprove
of the transformation can exit the corporation's capital without incurring
"unfair" losses. These issues are important in a market-based system of
corporate governance where dispersed capital market investors cannot easily oppose transformations proposed by management. The following discussion briefly explains the legal decision-making structure of the major
forms of corporate transformations, such as a merger or significant asset
sale, and its corporate governance import. It then discusses the availability
of exit for a French shareholder objecting to a transaction and the absence
of special obligations on directors relating to the elimination of minorities
from a corporation's capital.
management of specific business operations. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 226, C. soc., supra
note 1, at 382-389. Furthermore, under French law, representatives of employees (the
comitt d'entreprise)can demand considerable information from management. See JEAN.
TIN, supra note 77, at 156-57. Associations of shareholders also have considerable power
to address management abuses.
180. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 99-104 (recommending, among other things,
to improve the commissaires' audit of an enterprise and to give them additional powers to
address problems in financial accounts).
181. Senator Marini misses this point when he worries that the use of independent
directors in France may create a conflict with the commissaires. See Marini Report, supra
note 2, at 42. There can be no such conflict, since the commissaires are not legally
responsible for the direction of an enterprise.
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Decision-Making in Corporate Transformations

A corporate transformation may involve a combination of a corporation
with another (a "merger") or a sale of all, or substantially all, of the corporation's assets to the other corporation. In either event, the resulting business may look different, either because it combines previously separated
enterprises or because it significantly expands or decreases current operations. Under French law, the legally-mandated decision-making structure
applicable to some major corporate transformations is straightforward and
helps correct the shareholders' informational disadvantage. Information is
likely to be critical in this setting, for shareholders must decide whether to
approve a major transaction and whether to exit a corporation. In a classic
merger (where both companies, rather than their subsidiaries, are involved
in the transaction), the board of each French company must establish a
"projet"that describes, among other things, the transaction, the reasons for
it, and the exchange ratio. 18 2 The substance of this projet must be published in an official legal publication.' 8 3 A corporation must make additional information regarding the transaction available to its shareholders at
its corporate headquarters. The corporation must also provide recent
financial statements of both companies and a report by special commissaires d la fusion, appointed by a commercial court, who examine whether,
among other things, "le rapport d'echange est equitable."' 84 Shareholders of
each company must approve the transaction by a two-thirds vote of those
present at a special shareholders' meeting. 185 The sale of a major part of a
corporation's assets may follow a similar procedure, although, in practice,
only shareholders of a company purchasing another's assets for its own
18 6
shares are guaranteed the right to review the outlay of corporate funds.
Under French law, shareholders do not have a voice in all corporate
decisions regarding major transactions. For example, an acquisition may
be structured in such a way as to avoid the legal requirement of shareholder approval, as when a corporation conducts an acquisition or merger
through a subsidiary organized for that purpose (known as a "triangular"
merger or asset sale). The board of a large corporation may use this struc182. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 374, C. soc., supra note 1, at 519 (amended by Loi N2 8817 du 5 janvier 1988); D~cret N2 67-236, arts. 254-55, C. soc., supra note 1, at 688-89.

In the context of a merger, the COB supervises the disclosure to shareholders. See
Marie-Claude Robert, The Internationalizationof the Markets and the Experience of the
French COB with Mergers and Acquisitions, in EuRoPEAN TAKEOVERS: LAW AND PRACTICE
403, 404 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1992) [hereinafter EuRoPEAN
TAKEovERs].
183. See Loi Ns 66-537, art. 374, C. soc., supra note 1, at 519.
184. Decret N2 67-236, art. 258, C. soc., supra note 1, at 689-90; Loi N2 66-537, art.
377, C. soc., supra note 1, at 520-21.
185. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 376, C. soc., supra note 1, at 519-20.
186. See id. art. 387, C. soc., supra note 1, at 527-30. For shareholders of the selling
company, a sale of all assets might amount to a liquidation under French law, which
would trigger a shareholder vote. See CozAN & VIANDIER, supra note 98, at 573. The
Vinot Report recommends that a board should conduct a major sale or divestiture of a
company's assets only after receiving shareholder approval, although this is not now
required under French law. See Vienot Report, supra note 2, at 6.
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ture in order to conduct an acquisition or sale without having to present it
to the shareholders for their approval. The structure of a corporate group
thus permits the group to conduct significant mergers and acquisitions at
the subsidiary level without the approval of the parent corporation's shareholders. Finally, if, as is often the case, a controlling group or family dominates a public company, a minority shareholder vote to approve a merger is
not particularly significant, even when shareholders receive the vote,
because the dominant shareholder controls the outcome.
B. The Shareholders' Right of Exit
In some countries, such as the United States, corporate law grants shareholders the right, in certain major transactions, to demand that the corporation repurchase their shares at "fair value" if they disagree with the
transaction. This right, known as the appraisal or dissenters' remedy, owes
its origin to a former feature of corporate law, which mandated a unanimous shareholder approval of any major transaction. This unanimity
requirement became impractical as the number of shareholders increased,
for it allowed one shareholder to stand in the way of an economically
favorable or necessary transaction, or alternatively created an unwieldy
and unexpected corporate dissolution. Historians of the corporate form
suggest that, in exchange for the loss of their veto right, shareholders
received the right to walk away from an enterprise with the fair value of
18 7
their share.
The appraisal remedy has a corporate governance purpose. With the
rise of majority rule, the lack of veto authority subjects minority shareholders to potential abuses by a control group or person. Even when no such
controlling entity exists, minority shareholders may nevertheless find
themselves at the mercy of management, especially where the shareholders
are too dispersed to form a united opposition. A dissenting shareholder's
right to force a corporation to cash them out may thus check majoritarian
and management overreaching and is yet another legal method of addressing the positional weakness of capital market investors.1 8 8 The effectiveness of the appraisal remedy for corporate governance purposes depends,
however, upon its facility of use. For example, in the United States, the
remedy is not available in every transaction and its costs make it prohibitive to small shareholders. 189
187. 2 PRINCIPLES, supra note 110, at 291-314 (presenting the origins of the U.S.
appraisal remedy and summarizing scholarly work on it).
188. See id. at 292-93.
189. Under a typical U.S. state corporate law, a shareholder does not receive the
appraisal right in every major transaction. Nearly every state corporate law grants a
shareholder an appraisal right when his or her corporation is merging into another (but
not necessarily when another corporation is merging into his or her own). In certain
states, shareholders receive this right when their corporation is selling all, or substantially all, of its assets. See id. at 358-79 (summarizing in a chart, as of 1994, state corporate laws on appraisal). Delaware corporate law, for example, does not give a
shareholder an appraisal right upon the sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's
assets. Nor does the right attach when a corporation conducts a major transaction
through a subsidiary. In some cases, as under Delaware corporate law, a shareholder of
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This kind of appraisal remedy (that is, a judicial determination of fair
value) does not generally exist under French corporate law. A shareholder
of a French corporation involved in a merger cannot request that the company purchase his or her shares at fair value. The absence of this right can
have serious consequences in French corporate governance, for controlling
shareholders can decide to conduct a merger and determine the terms of
the transaction. 190 In certain cases, however, CMF regulations create a
rough equivalent of appraisal for shareholders in French publicly-owned
companies. If a person or group acquires more than one-third of the shares
of the surviving company in a nonmerger context (for example, by
purchasing a control block from a controlling shareholder), such person or
group is required to make a buyout offer for all of the outstanding
shares. 19 1
In a merger where minority shareholders are offered cash or other
nonshare consideration in return for their shares (in other words, they are
"frozen out" of the enterprise), they have no immediate right to approach a
court to ask for a determination of the "fair value" of their shares. Yet, at
this point in time, if a party had become a dominant shareholder, owning
more than one-third of the total shares, through a prior share acquisition,
the above CMF rule may have already come into play to ensure that minority shareholders have some exit strategy. In this acquisition situation, the
CMF demands that the offer include a justification for the price offered for
the shares and it can hold up the offer if it finds that price unacceptable. 192 An independent French agency, if not immediately a court, thus
examines the substance of an offer in a transaction that may eventually
193
lead to a merger.
a publicly-traded corporation (or a corporation with a certain number of shareholders)
will not have an appraisal right, even in a "classic" merger, if he or she ends up holding
shares of a publicly traded corporation as a result of the transaction, whether of his or
her own company or of another firm. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (1996).
Appraisal is a potentially cumbersome and expensive process. As a typical statutory
procedure indicates, a shareholder must elect the remedy prior to the shareholder vote
on the transaction. Then, he or she must file a petition requesting a court to determine
the "fair value" of the shares as of the date before the transaction and this determination
demands a trial with all its pre-trial proceedings and costs, particularly on valuation
issues. For an example of the procedural complexity of appraisal, see DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit. 8, § 262(d)-(k). See also 2 PRINCIPLES, supra note 110, at 293 (providing the standard
criticisms of the appraisal remedy). During the appraisal proceeding, unless the shareholder withdraws, he or she receives no dividends nor has any other rights (e.g., voting)
as to the shares. This procedural difficulty, which requires the involvement of lawyers,
guarantees that the only shareholders electing appraisal are those with a significant
stake in the enterprise, not small capital market investors.
190. See Eddy Wymeersch, Problems of the Regulation of Takeover Bids in Western
Europe: A Comparative Survey, in EUROPEAN TAKEovERs, supra note 182, at 95, 104.
191. See CMF R~glement Gentral, art. 5-4-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 931-32. For
further discussion, see infra Part V.B.
192. See id. arts. 5-2-5, 5-2-7, C. soc., supra note 1, at 928.
193. French shareholders can challenge CMF determinations in the French Cour
d'Appel, thus involving French courts in valuation disputes. See D~cret N2 88-603 du 7
mai 1988, [19881 JO 8 mai 6606, art. 3, C. soc. 836 (Paul Le Cannu ed., 13th ed. Petits
Code Dalloz 1996) (Fr.).
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There are several additional exit possibilities for minority shareholders
when a supermajority shareholder (one who has 95% of the votes) exists,
which may be the case following a tender offer or other significant transaction (such as where a few shareholders declined, or neglected to, tender
their shares in the original offer). Either the minority can request the CMF
to order the majority holder to make them an offer to purchase their shares,
or the majority on its own initiative can propose the offer. 19 4 In either
case, the CMF reviews the "fairness" of the offering price. Pursuant to a
recent change in French law, and similar to a situation common in the
United States, 195 the 95% supermajority shareholder can now compel the
minority to take
the offer and exit the corporation's capital (effect a
csqueeze-out'). 19 6 In this case, the law provides that the CMF evaluate the
minority's shares using valuation methods accepted in the financial
community.
Shareholders in a French public company also receive an official exit
in certain cases involving a sale of all, or substantially all, of a company's
assets (and in other major corporate events). 19 7 Under CMF regulations, if
a controlling shareholder decides upon the sale, it must alert the CMF and
begin a procedure to repurchase the minority's shares. Again, this procedure involves CMF review of the offering price. 198 Under French law, a
shareholder is presumed to control a corporation if he or she holds 40% of
the votes and no other shareholder holds more, or if facts suggests that he
or she controls shareholder decisions albeit with a smaller holding. 19 9
Finally, French shareholders of public companies can always "exit" by selling their shares into the market, although sometimes at a discount.
Are capital market shareholders in France really worse off than their
counterparts in countries with laws that provide for a judicial evaluation of
a "fair" exit price when a major transaction is proposed? French law does
not offer shareholders an exit in every situation where a typical state's corporate law would provide such relief. (For example, mergers fall in this
category.) Where French law offers shareholders an exit, an independent
market agency, not a court, initially reviews the terms of the offer, so that
minority shareholders do not have to bear the expense of arguing with the
company over the proper valuation of their shares. 20 0 However, dissatisfied
minority shareholders can proceed to the French Cour d'Appel to challenge
a CMF determination, generally its approval of a company's valuation
methods. 2 0 1 If the CMF and the COB take their substantive review of offer194. See CMF R~glement G~neral, arts. 5-5-1 to 5-5-6, C. soc., supra note 1, at 934-36.
195. See DE.. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 253(a) (1996) (allowing a 90% shareholder to merge
a corporation's subsidiary into it without any vote of subsidiary's shareholders).
196. See CoziAN & VIu'AmNR, supra note 98, at 409; see CMF Riglement Genfral, arts.
5-61, 5-6-2, C. soc., supra note 1, at 936-37.
197. For a list of these events, see Marini Report, supra note 2, at 71-72.
198. See CMF R~glement Gnral, art 5-5-5, C. soc., supra note 1, at 935.
199. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 355-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 486-88.
200. See Marie-No~lle Domp6, Offres publiques: Reglementation et contestation, P~nTEs
AFmCHES, June 15, 1994, at 27, 28-30.
201. See id.
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ing prices seriously in these situations, as a practical matter where French
law provides these exit alternatives, they may be more useful to minority
shareholders than a solely court-based appraisal remedy with all its litigation expenses. 20 2 This independent review of price is critical for capital
market shareholders in France because market capitalization is smaller
and market liquidity is less than that which exists in the United States.
Therefore, the option of selling shares into the market may not always be
the best way of realizing their "fair" value.
C.

Additional Protection for Shareholders in Freeze-Outs
Because a freeze-out places capital market shareholders in a vulnerable
position (in a situation where they are being "cashed out" of a company's
capital by a controlling shareholder electing to merge the corporation with
a special acquisition vehicle), they may need special legal protection. Generally in a weaker position than management, minority shareholders
occupy an even more precarious position when facing a management and
board which represent a major shareholder who may desire to eliminate
them from a corporation's capital in pursuit of his or her own interests.
This is not an uncommon situation in France, given the extent of family
and controlling group capitalism. In this situation, managers and the
board of directors may be inclined to offer a price to the minority shareholders that favors the dominant shareholder. At an informational disadvantage, the minority shareholders cannot be sure that they are receiving a
"fair" price. Further, their minority position and the lack of public information about the controlling shareholder's plans for the corporation may
cause the market itself to impose a "discount" on their shares. 20 3 Given
the controlling shareholder's dominance, the minority shareholders have
few options but to accept the price offered in the merger. 20 4 To protect
shareholders in these circumstances, U.S. corporate law enhances directors' duties of good faith, care and loyalty. In addition, U.S. federal securities laws impose specific disclosure requirements upon the merging
20 5
corporations and controlling shareholders.
202. The evidence suggests that these market authorities take their review seriously.
See Robert, supra note 182, at 414-16 (also noting that the COB reviews disclosure relating to such transactions).
203. See CLARK, supra note 75, at 508-09 (describing how majority shareholder may

depress market price of stock to take advantage of minority shareholders).
204. There are often valid reasons to eliminate minority shareholders from a business,
e.g., taking a company private and thereby saving the cost and trouble of a public
company.
205. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (Delaware cause of
action for unfair treatment of shareholders in a freeze-out); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13E-3(d)

(1995) (requiring any company or affiliate, including a controlling shareholder thereof,
that, among other things, "goes private" (effects a "freeze-out" of minority shareholders
resulting in the company becoming privately-held) to file with the SEC and to disclose to
minority shareholders information about the transaction and its procedure as required
by Schedule 13E-3). Small shareholders can easily find attorneys willing to take cases
based on a violation of either of these laws for a contingency fee since there is an economic incentive to such counsel, i.e., numerous minority shareholders can be joined in a

"class action," which means an increased potential recovery for the lawyer, who gener-
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Although French corporate law does not afford comparable protections against freeze-out problems as does its American counterpart, oversight by market authorities may, nevertheless, be adequate to deal with
abuses by controlling shareholders in certain situations. For example,
French law mandates a buyout offer to the minority shareholders under the
CMF's supervision, ultimately with court review. If the CMF provides adequate supervision of these offers and the offering price, it is questionable
whether any additional check on the majority shareholder and its "controlled" directors is needed in such cases. Moreover, French directors are
held by law to high standards of conduct so as to avoid conflicts of interest,
and their misbehavior subjects them to civil and criminal penalties. In a
freeze-out situation, a shareholder in a French company appears currently
to have the legal basis to sue a director for failing to analyze adequately the
transaction from the perspective of all the shareholders, when the director
approved a merger involving a corporation's controlling party on the other
side of the transaction6 and followed without question the controlling share20
holder's demands.
Whether more jurisprudence on directors' duties and more disclosure
will develop in France in this kind of transaction depends upon future
restructuring of French companies and any perception that current French
law inadequately protects minorities. U.S. legal developments on minority
treatment in these contexts can be traced to a period of restructuring in
U.S. public companies that often resulted in the "going private" of formerly
public companies and the elimination of minority shareholders. Because
present French market policy is directed towards encouraging more public
shareholders, not eliminating those who exist, French finance circumstances may not lead to similar legal developments. Yet, because of the
likely continued existence of dominant shareholders in French public companies and their control over major transactions, it may become important
to enhance the duties of directors towards all shareholders in such transactions to attract public investors into French capital markets.
V. French Legal Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate
Control
The market for corporate control, or the takeover market, characterizes
market capitalism. Some Europeans view this kind of restructuring as hostile and wasteful. 20 7 If managers do not produce immediate results, or

even sometimes if they do and a financier wants to take advantage of their
success, a potential buyer is always in the wings. Investors, eager for quick
profits, are ready either to sell to this buyer (or some other bidder drawn
into the contest by the lure of easy gains) or to professional traders ("arbially takes 1/3 of the damages awarded. For small shareholders, the suits thus offer a
more practical form of redress than appraisal.
206. The difficulty of bringing and financing such a suit may undercut its usefulness.
See infra Part VI.D.
207. See ALBERT, supra note 62, at 75-98.
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trageurs"), who earn their living by purchasing shares in these circumstances, that is, by putting companies into "play." Managers have no
choice but to focus upon short-term results and defensive measures, at the
expense of long-term projects and research and development. The restructuring generates enormous transaction costs and ultimately benefits only
the financiers, investment bankers, and lawyers. It invariably destroys
companies, which must be broken up and sold to pay down the debt that
buyers incur to finance their purchases and injures creditors and employand these parties, who principally capees to the benefit of shareholders
20 8
gains.
wealth
the
ture
While some scholars agree with this portrayal of the market for corporate control, others, even if they do not absolutely condemn the hostile
tender offer which characterizes this market, find it a blunt instrument for
restructuring. 20 9 Many economists, finance theorists, and business law
professors, however, believe that the market for corporate control addresses
the basic agency problem of disciplining management in a market capital
210
situation and that its nefarious effects have been greatly exaggerated.
They view the threat of a tender offer as a way to keep in check powerful
managers, who are always tempted to take advantage of shareholders by
engaging in negative net present value investments, and as a way to force
the managers to make the restructuring called for by economic circumstances. 2 11 In the most vilified form of a tender offer - a leveraged buyout
or "LBO" - a company is purchased by funds borrowed on the security of
the company's assets, often followed by a bust-up sale of the company.
This makes perfect sense from a finance perspective, as shareholders can
cash out and the excessive leverage keeps management within tight fiscal
constraints. Many scholars, therefore, regret the declining use of the hostile offer in the United States, which they attribute to laws passed at the
demands of managers and other interest groups, such as labor unions, who
are unwilling to accept the needed restructuring which threatens their
2 12
positions.
Given that the takeover has been, and continues to be, an important
aspect of business restructuring in any market capitalism situation,2 13 it is
thus necessary to review how French law regulates this phenomenon.
There have been many tender offers in France, but few have been hostile. 2 14 According to Professor Wymeersch, French tender offer regulation,
208. See generally MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANcE FOR THE TWEN-rrY-FIRsT CENTURY 61-68 (1995).
209. For a useful summary of positions both criticizing and supporting takeovers, see
VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATrON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE

939-56 (4th ed. 1993).
210. See, e.g., Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence,
reprinted in THE NEW CORPORATE FINANCE: WHERE THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 465-91 (Donald H. Chew, Jr., ed., 1993).
211. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 5, at 850-52.
212. See RoE, supra note 27, at 226-30.
213. SeeJensen, supra note 5, at 831-35. See also Pound, supra note 5, at 1011-17.
214. See OECD FRANCE, supra note 46, at 118 (observing that, although merger and
acquisition activity in France is far below that of the U.K., it leads that in other European
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like that in most other Continental countries, has been used to eliminate
public shareholders after a controlling block of shares has been transferred
between parties, such as groups or families. This form of regulation generally does not effect control changes. 2 15 Although French corporate law regulates tender offers in detail, the law and related court decisions are
relatively recent products of the 1980s and 1990s.216 The following sum-

marizes some striking features of French regulation of tender offers from a
market capital perspective and suggests that French regulation limits, but
does not eliminate, the French market for corporate control.
A. French Legal Impediments to the Market for Corporate Control
Numerous provisions in French law give management (with the board's
acquiescence) time to prepare its defenses and power to make a company
an unfavorable candidate for a takeover. Management of French companies have an "early warning" system. French corporate law requires shareholders, acting alone or "agissantde concert," who own shares in excess of
certain defined thresholds (i.e., 5%, 10%, 20%, 331/3%, 50%, 662/3%) of
the company's capital or voting rights to declare their existence within five
business days to the CMF and within fifteen calendar days to the company.
If they fail to do so, they lose voting rights on those shares in excess of the
21 7
thresholds for two years, or such longer period as imposed by the CMF.
Companies can also lower the thresholds to .5% and increments thereof.
Since companies know the identity of shareholders having shares in registered form (titre nominatif or on the company's books), this law is useful
in bearer form (au porteur) and where parwhere shareholders hold them
21 8
ties are acting "de concert."
countries). Times may be changing, however. See John Rossant, Why Merger Mania Is
Rocking the Continent, Bus. WK., Oct. 27, 1997, at 64 (describing hostile offers in
France).
215. See Wymeersch, supra note 190, at 101-03.
216. A complete explanation of this law and of its corporate governance effects is
beyond the scope of this Article. An excellent discussion of French tender offer regulation and its background (to which the following discussion owes a great deal) is found
in SCHOEN, supra note 82, at 79-145. See also CozAu & VtLaniaa, supra note 98, at 60015; AndrE Tunc, Les Prises de controle par l'intermddiaredu march, in CORPORATE TAKaOvERs THROUGH THE PUBLIC MARKErs 157 (Phaedon John Kozyris ed., 1996).
217. See Loi N2 66-537, arts. 356, 356-1,356-4, C. soc., supra note 1, at 488-90, 49495.
218. Since all French shares are "dematerialized," this shareholding distinction has
no physical meaning. Shares of French companies are "held" in the official French
depositary, SICOVAM: registered shares are in a company account (or in the account of
a bank acting as the company's agent) with this depositary, and bearer shares are held
through financial intermediaries that also have SICOVAM accounts. French law permits
a company's statuts to provide that the company can ask SICOVAM to require the
intermediaries to identify the beneficial shareholders (the company's bearer shares are
then known as titres porteurs identifiables). See Loi N2 66-537, art. 263-1, C. soc., supra
note 1, at 423-24 (added by Loi N2 87-416 du 17 juin 1987). This cumbersome procedure does not always produce accurate information. In fact, with the growth of international, particularly Anglo-Saxon, investors in the capital of their companies, French
managers are concerned that the law does not adequately permit them to identify nonresident shareholders. See generally Valuet, supra note 107, at 708 (noting a problem
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These declarations of share ownership alert the management of a target company to the identity of new significant shareholders. COB regulation supplements this disclosure by requiring an acquiror of more than
20% of a company's voting rights to declare whether, in the next twelve
months, it intends to continue to acquire shares, take control of the company or request a seat on the board. 2 19 Supporting both this regulation
and the early warning law is the rule regarding acting de concert, which is
2 20
broadly defined to include agreements to acquire or sell voting rights.
This term, with its detailed jurisprudence, 2 2 1 covers an agreement by several persons to act jointly to take control of a company. Any agreement
among shareholders dealing with a preferential purchase and sale of shares
(for example, a right of first refusal) must also be disclosed to the CMF,
2 22
which then makes it public.
Under French law, management can also take defensive measures to
ward off hostile bidders and avoid market discipline. A peculiar feature of
French corporate law is that its charter or a special shareholder meeting
may grant double voting rights to shares held in registered form for at least
two years. 2 23 From one corporate governance perspective prevalent in
France, this provision rewards patient capital and thereby promotes longterm relationships between shareholders and management. From a market
capital perspective, however, the device allows management to create a
friendly shareholder group whose influence in the company grows while
that of capital market investors declines, for the latter are likely to hold
securities in bearer form, thus making them ineligible for double voting
rights. In addition, under French corporate law, a company's charter may
permit it to limit the total number of voting rights of any shareholder to a
set percentage (the rule must apply to all shareholders), seriously
obstructing a change of control. 2 24 The COB disapproves of these limitations when they are not coupled with "outs" (the elimination of these limiand proposing a solution whereby financial intermediaries identify their non-French
shareholders). Capital market investors' need for the "early warning" system thus
remains.
219. See COB R~glement N2 88-02, reprinted in Loi N2 66-537, art. 356-1, notes, C.
soc., supra note 1, at 489.
220. Loi N2 66-537, art. 356-1-3, C. soc., supra note 1, at 491-93 (providing "[s]ont
consid&6es comme agissant de concert les personnes qui ont conclu un accord en vue
d'acqu~rir ou de ceder des droits de vote ou en vue d'exercer des droits de vote pour

mettre en oeuvre une politique commune vis-a-vis de la socitY.").
221. Cozit & VLAruiER, supra note 98, at 416-17.

222. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 356-1-4, C. soc., supra note 1, at 493 (providing that any

agreement, made between shareholders of a company whose shares are listed on a regulated stock market, that includes special conditions of sale or acquisition of shares must

be communicated to the CMF, which will publicize it).
223. See id. art. 175, C. soc., supra note 1, at 334-35. These double voting rights can

be limited to French or EU shareholders.
224. See id. art. 177, C. soc., supra note 1, at 335. Apart from double voting rights,
French corporate law does not permit the issuance of shares with supervoting rights

(see art. 174 for the "one share, one vote" principle), which could have an anti-takeover
effect. A French company can, however, issue nonvoting shares with dividend priority.
See id. art. 177-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 335-36.
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tations upon acquisition of majority voting rights by a party), 2 25 and
2 26
Senator Marini recommends changing French law to this effect.

The characteristic closeness of the French business world reinforces
the effect of these limitations on voting rights. Although blatant abuses
(such as secret agreements among companies and shareholders and secret
holdings of shares) are now illegal, 22 7 managers can create a friendly
shareholder group (a noyau dur) of other companies, often bound together
in elaborate cross-shareholdings with one another. The group's shareholders agree to hold their shares for a specified period of time, to limit the
number of shares of the target any of them can acquire, and to give the
others a right of first refusal if they dispose of their shares. They may also
hold warrants exercisable for shares of the target in certain circumstances.
While the corporate governance implications of this arrangement are subject to debate, it is dearly a defensive device for management in privatized
2 28
companies that no longer have the State as a major shareholder.
As the history of French takeovers has shown, these defenses are not
impregnable. However, French tender offers generally occur as consensual, rather than hostile, transactions. French shareholders can remove
board members without cause at a shareholders' meeting. 2 29 In addition,
French law strictly limits a company's share repurchase: it can only serve
as a reduction of capital.2 30 The law has also removed much of the benefit
225. See ScHOEN, supra note 82, at 111.
226. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 93-94. Marini recommends that the limitations become void once a shareholder has acquired over 50% of the voting rights so that
they do not seriously impede changes in control. See id. This recommendation, however, does not address the situation where a significant shareholder (or shareholders)
does not want control of a company, but wishes to express its displeasure with management through its vote.
227. See supra Part II.
228. See Fanto, Transformation of FrenchCorporateGovernance,supra note 2, at 59-67.
See generally MORIN & Dupuy, supra note 67; Tunc, supra note 216, at 162. On the
legality of these agreements, see generally JEAN-JAcQUEs DAIGRE & MONIQUE SETI-LLESDUPOr, PAcTES D'Acro -mR
.s (1995). While recognizing the pro-management effect
of the noyaux, Senator Marini does not believe that legislation can address this phenomenon, because he attributes it to the small size of the French capital markets which
encourages companies to look to other companies for capital. See Marini Report, supra
note 2, at 44. He does recommend, however, that the French State not establish new
cross-shareholdings in future privatizations, see id. at 50, and that existing ones be adequately disclosed to investors, see id. at 69. In some privatizations, moreover, the French
government retains an absolute veto right (1'action sp~cifique) on major transactions,
such as a change of control, which removes the company completely from the corporate
control market. See generally Pezard, supra note 56.
229. See Loi Ns 66-537, art. 160, C. soc., supra note 1, at 319-20.
230. See id. art. 217, C. soc., supranote 1, at 369-70. Unlike the case for U.S. companies, French companies cannot repurchase their shares as an alternative to paying dividends to return cash to shareholders or to change their capital structure when debt
financing is cheaper than equity financing. See RICHAD A. BREAEY & STEvART C.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 419-20 (5th ed. 1996) (discussing finance reasons for share repurchase). If the shareholders agree, a French company can repurchase
its shares to "stabilize" its share price, see Loi N2 66-537, art. 217-2, C. soc., supranote 1,
at 370-71, but it cannot hold more than 10% of its own capital, and such "treasury"
shares have no voting or dividend rights, see id. art. 217-3, C. soc., supra note 1, at 371.
Senator Marini and the CNPF, an organization of French company management, both
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of having subsidiaries hold a company's shares (auto-contrdle) for defensive purposes, 23 1 although shares can still be sold to employees, who are
usually favorable to management and hostile to outsiders threatening a
restructuring. Generally, a company cannot grant defensive "lock-up"
options on its assets, either directly or indirectly. 23 2 While friendly parties
may acquire warrants and other special preferred shares, it is questionable
whether French corporate law would permit the kinds of poison pills
2 33
which allow a bargain purchase of a target or an acquiror's shares.
B. French Procedural Regulation of a Tender Offer
French tender offer procedures demonstrate both the restrictions and flexibility of French law. If a person (or persons acting in concert), directly or
indirectly, acquires more than 30% of the votes of a listed company, with
some exceptions, he or she must make a public offer for the remaining
shares. 2 34 The rule (designed to comply with an earlier version of the
European Union's proposed Thirteenth Directive 235 ) protects minority
shareholders when a person assumes control gradually through market
purchases or all at once by the purchase of a control block.2 36 From the
perspective of protecting capital market shareholders, the provision for an
exit upon a change in control makes particular sense in French capitalism
where these investors co-exist with, and are usually at the mercy of, controlling shareholders or organized groups of shareholders. In a similar
vein, the CMF may authorize a person (or persons), who has obtained
more than 50% of the voting rights or shares, to purchase the remaining
shares by holding itself ready to acquire any shares tendered on the market
during a set period of time. 23 7 Both of these procedures, however, discourage changes in control and the monitoring of management promoted by
such changes, as they make them more expensive for bidders than, for
recommend expanding the ability of French companies to repurchase shares. See Marini
Report, supra note 2, at 62; CONSEIL NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRANCAls, PRoPosIToNs DE
MODIFICATIONS DU CADRE LtGISLATIF ET RIGLEMENTAIRE DU RAcHAT

PAR

UNE

SocIfrr

DE

SEs PROPRES ACTIONS (fiche N2 1, Sept. 25, 1996). Yet neither Senator Marini nor the
CNPF address the anti-takeover implications of their proposals, such as defensive use of
the repurchase by company management to reduce the number of outstanding shares.
231. See SCHOEN, supra note 82, at 118.
232. See id. at 122.
233. See id. at 131-33. If shareholders have already delegated authority to a French
board to issue new shares, the board may undertake such issuances (to a friendly party)
as a takeover defense. See Tunc, supra note 216, at 181.
234. See CMF RPglement G~nfral, art 5-4-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 931-32. Under
article 5-4-3, the acquiror of a company that holds more than one-third of a listed company's capital or votes must make a bid for the listed company, if such holding represents "une part essentielle" of the acquired company's assets. This mandatory bid
procedure also applies to a greater than 1/3 shareholder that increases his or her holding by an additional 2% in less than a year. See id. art. 5-4-3.
235. Proposal for a 13th European Parliament and Council Directive on Company
Law Concerning Takeover Bids, COM(95) 655 final (Feb. 7, 1996).
236. Before 1992, a bidder passing this threshold had to make an offer for only twothirds of the company's shares. See SCHOEN, supra note 82, at 81-83.
237. See id. at 99-103.
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example, a tender offer simply for majority control of a company. 238
Under another French tender offer procedure, a party may launch a
"voluntary" tender offer for all the shares of a company. 23 9 Subject to the
CMF's approval, the bidder can condition the offer upon receiving at least a
set percentage of shares (enough to give it the majority of the votes).
Although the French market and market authorities view a tender offer for
less than all of the shares of a company as coercive of capital market shareholders, as a practical matter, the offeror may not care that it must bid for
2 40
all the shares even if it does not expect to acquire all of them.
French regulation also affects the tender offer price and may thereby
benefit capital market shareholders because, when coupled with the rule
regarding an all-shares offer, it deters low-priced, coercive bids. It is difficult, however, to see the need for an "official" substantive review of price,
so long as the all-shares requirement exists, for a successful tender offer
usually involves giving shareholders a premium to market price. Where a
public tender offer follows a transfer of a controlling block - a potentially
coercive "freeze-out" situation - the review may make sense because it
ensures that some independent body evaluates whether capital market
investors obtain the "fair price" for their shares.2 4 ' The CMF reviews the
price and obvious evaluative measures, such as premium to market price,
asset price, and stock price to earnings ratio. 24 2 Whether this evaluation
in fact hinders tender offers in France depends upon how restrictively the
CMF applies the regulation.
Aside from price review, French tender offer regulation ensures that
the capital market investor receives information about the bid and the bidder and has time to consider the offer. Through a bank or banks acting on
its behalf, a bidder presents a dossier to the CMF that describes, among
other things, its purpose in making the offer, its existing shareholding in
238. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The InstitutionalInvestor as Corporate Monitor,91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1316 (1991). Professor Wymeersch argues that
such "mandatory bid" procedures are not as friendly to capital market shareholders as
they seem. See Eddy Wymeersch, The Mandatory Bid: A Critical View, in EUROPEAN
Txa ovFas, supra note 182, at 351. According to Wymeersch, since they potentially
increase the cost of a change of control for the bidder (who must acquire all the shares if
he or she triggers the procedure), they actually encourage bidders to negotiate control
transactions first with the existing controlling shareholder (who is generally present in
French public companies). The bidder and such shareholder may structure the transaction in a way that eliminates the need for a mandatory bid or that benefits them at the
expense of minority shareholders in the target. In other words, the mandatory bid
requirement discourages hostile changes of control which occur through the market. See
id. at 360-64.
239. See CMF R~glement G~nfral, art 5-2-2, C. soc., supra note 1, at 923.
240. French regulations also require that a voluntary tender offer be for all "financial
instruments giving access to capital or to voting rights" and thus includes preferred and
convertible shares. See id.
241. In the "garantiede cours" (i.e., where a majority shareholder stands ready to
purchase all shares tendered on the market), the bidder must generally offer the same
price to public shareholders as it paid in purchasing a control block. See ScHoN,supra
note 82, at 101.
242. See CMF R~glement G~nral, art 5-2-7, C. soc., supra note 1, at 924. See also
SCHOEN,supra note 82, at 83-84.
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the target, any share minimum that must be tendered, and the price offered
with a justification thereof. 24 3 The CMF reviews the offer for five business
days and can require modifications to it or refuse it altogether. At the same
time that the CMF is conducting its review, a bank acting on behalf of the
bidder must file a draft prospectus (note d'information)with the COB that
includes the following information: (1) the bidder's identity; (2) its intentions as to the company's future operation and listing for the next twelve
months; (3) the price offered; (4) financing for the offer; (5) any agreements between the bidder and others regarding the acquisition; and (6)
financial information.2 44 The COB may demand supplemental information, disapprove of the prospectus altogether (which it rarely does), or even
give its own views on the offer, which must be included in the prospectus. 245 Once the prospectus is approved, the bidder sends it to the target

company and publishes it in a financial paper (unless all the company's
shareholders hold shares in registered form, in which case the prospectus
is simply sent to all of them). 246 Upon receiving the bidder's prospectus,
the target must file its own prospectus with the COB describing, among
other things, the shareholding structure of the company both at the time of
filing and a year earlier, any agreements it has with respect to the offer, the
board's views on the offer (as well as any minority views of the board), and
financial statements. 24 7 This prospectus must be made public in the same
manner as the bidder's. The COB also requires that certain events occurring after the publication of the prospectus be publicized. 248
Shareholders have twenty business days in which to decide whether to
accept an offer and can withdraw their tenders at any time before the end
of the offering period. If a competing bidder wants to make a tender offer,
it must do so at least five business days before the close of the first offer. 24 9
Upon this new bid, any tenders to the original offer become void, and
shareholders have until the end of the second bid to decide whether to
accept either offer, or reject both. In fact, the original bidder must respond
to a competing offer by announcing its intention either to maintain, withdraw or increase its bid.250 More importantly, a competing bid must be at

least 2% higher than the initial bid; and any response to it must involve an
243. See CMF R~glement G~nfral, art. 5-2-5, C. soc., supra note 1, at 923-24.
244. See COB R~glement Genfral, art. 5-2-1, C. soc., supra note 1, at 922-23; COB
R~glement N 89-03, arts. 7-8, C. soc., supra note 1, at 94849 (Fr.).
245. COB decisions are subject to the judicial review of the Paris Cour d'Appel. See
D~cret N2 90-263 du 23 mars 1990, [1990] JO 25 mars 3655, art. 6, C. soc., supra note
1, at 953-56 (Fr.).
246. See id. arts. 10, 12, C. soc., supra note 1, at 955-56.
247. See id. art. 11, C. soc., supra note 1, at 956. If the transaction is a friendly one,
the bidder and the target can file a joint prospectus.
248. COB Rhglement N2 89-03, art. 4, 12, C. soc., supra note 1, at 948, 950 (article 4
requires notification of agreements between a target's shareholders and third parties,
such as a "white knight;" article 12 allows the COB to request the CMF to hold open the
offer period so that information reaches shareholders).
249. See CMF Rhglement G~nfral, art. 5-2-14, C. soc., supra note 1, at 925.
250. See id. art. 5-2-15, C. soc., supra note 1, at 926.
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additional 2% increase over its bid (and so on).2 5 '

French market authorities generally take the view that bidders must
have equal chances to compete and disfavor extreme management efforts
either to favor one bidder at the expense of its shareholders or to block a
tender offer completely. 25 2 French law strictly regulates a target's or bidder's purchase of securities outside the bid and requires disclosure of any
such purchases, special defensive measures, or agreements. 25 3 It appears
that French law would not allow lock-up options on key assets or special
share option arrangements. 2 54 Management of a French company can
resist a tender offer and, as noted above, has many ways of doing so. Once
a bidder appears, however, management does not have the freedom to take
a "scorched earth" approach.
C. Summary
The best sign that French regulation is not a significant impediment to
tender offers is that they occur with some frequency in France, although
again they do not necessarily have the same change-in-control effect as is
typical of U.S. tender offers. 25 5 In fact, if French companies attract more
capital market shareholders and if the networks of company cross-shareholdings diminish in importance, then there could be a rise in this form of
restructuring and its accompanying disciplinary effect on management. In
such an event, current French law adequately protects shareholders, and, if
abuses develop, the CMF and the COB have the power to increase their
review of these transactions.
If, however, hostile tender offers increase in France, then management
may increasingly choose to oppose them. Even without such an occurrence, management in companies without a dominant shareholder may
take such action if its other defenses, such as the noyaux durs and continued State ownership, diminish. Recently, for example, the Conseil
National du Patronat Frangais has proposed changes to French corporate
law specifically designed to enhance management's ability to resist
unwanted tender offers. It requested that the CMF prolong a tender offer
up to 40 days to give managers the time to call an extraordinary shareholders' meeting, where shareholders could approve management strategy contrary to the offer (for example, an asset sale or a merger with a "white
knight"). It also asked the CMF to lower the French company law declaration of share ownership and future intentions from the present 20% threshold to 10%.256 It will be interesting to see whether, with such legal efforts
251. See id. art. 5-2-24, C. soc., supra note 1, at 928. However, a new bidder need not
offer more than the original offer price if it meets that price while suppressing any minimum share condition to acceptance.
252. See SCHOEN, supra note 82, at 131.
253. See id. at 89-90.
254. See id. at 128, 131-33.
255. See id. at 3-16 (describing the recent history of French securities markets, which
in effect centers around tender offers).
256. See, e.g., CONSEIL NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRAN;us, DfROULEMENT DES OFFRES
2
2
PUBLIQUES (le 10 octobre 1996; fiche N 2, Sept. 25, 1996; fiche N 3, Sept. 25, 1996)
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to resist these transactions, there will be increased development in somewhat neglected areas of French law, such as a directors' duties in a tender
offer, which could protect shareholders against this opportunistic management resistance.
VI. Corporate Governance and Shareholder Suits
Although imposing duties upon company directors has by itself a corporate
governance impact, punishing those who fail to fulfill their duties helps
ensure that directors take them seriously. Similarly, mandatory disclosure
affects corporate governance by correcting the informational disadvantage
of dispersed investors when there is an enforcement mechanism for the
accuracy of such disclosure. Shareholder lawsuits against the board and
managers enforce board duties and company disclosure. In the eyes of
many Europeans, this monitoring characterizes market capitalism: litigation against companies and their agents has become so prevalent in the
Anglo-Saxon world that board members and managers cannot take any
business action or make any statement about company prospects without
running the risk of incurring numerous suits that are costly and time-consuming to defend and that make company management overly cautious in
the future. Nonetheless, shareholder suits against management are possible under French law.
A. The French "Derivative" Lawsuit
Directors owe duties directly to the corporation, which is a separate legal
personality, and thus owe these duties indirectly to its shareholders. Any
violation of these duties harms the corporation and, indirectly, the shareholders. In enforcing director obligations, therefore, shareholders are
really acting on the corporation's behalf against its agents. Their lawsuit is
257
derivative: it derives from the corporation's right to sue.
From this basic concept of a derivative shareholder right of action
arises the potential procedural complexity of the lawsuit, as well as difficult
substantive issues which have corporate governance implications. 258
Although the lawsuit "belongs" to the corporation, it often makes sense for
(discussing these proposals pertaining to law discussed supra at text accompanying note
217). See also Valuet, supra note 107, at 708 (discussing proposal to allow French companies to identify non-French shareholders as partially justified by takeover concerns).
Politically-motivated resistance to tender offers in France also arises through the promulgation of laws, such as the privatization law allowing for the "golden share," which make
it difficult for non-EU members to acquire French companies in politically "sensitive"
businesses. Since many potential bidders for French companies may come from outside
France, management may play upon nationalist feelings to push for the enactment of
other laws impeding or preventing tender offers by foreigners.
257. When directors harm shareholders "directly" (e.g., by abusing minority shareholders), shareholders have a direct, not a derivative, lawsuit. The distinction is not
always easy to draw. See 2 PRINCIPLES, supra note 110, at 18-20 (discussing distinction
with examples of each). The following discussion focuses on the derivative suit, but
direct lawsuits dearly have a corporate governance impact as well. See infra Part VI.B.
258. For a general discussion of these issues, see KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 112, at
195-201; 2 PRINCIPLES, supra note 110, at 4-9.
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shareholders to bring it. Since the corporation acts through its directors
and managers, they are unlikely to want to sue themselves or one of their
number. Some outside party is needed, and no one is better suited to pursue the directors than the residual owners of the corporation. However,
because the suit is on behalf of the corporation, the corporation through its
agents should have the right to decide the questions which arise in all litigation: whether the costs of a lawsuit justify its benefits; whether, if a suit
is commenced, it should be pursued, and how far; and whether other corrective action is more appropriate. As with other "problem" situations, corporate solutions that are less costly than litigation could address the
conflict of interest in the board's decision concerning a derivative lawsuit.
Since any recovery from a lawsuit accrues to the corporation and since any
individual shareholder generally receives (again indirectly) only a small
part of such recovery, he or she has little economic incentive to bring the
suit.25 9 Consequently, outsiders to the corporation, such as lawyers spe-

cializing in such actions, may be the driving force behind many of these
suits.
The French "derivative" lawsuit exists without much procedural complexity and without any debate concerning its existence. French directors
and officers owe their duties to the corporation as such, and, since any
violation directly harms the corporation, its representatives (the directors)
should bring the lawsuit. In fact, under French law, the lawsuit belongs to
the directors. 2 60 Yet French law allows a shareholder or group of shareholders to bring a suit in the company's name (l'action sociale ut singuli).261
Only current shareholders can bring the lawsuit, but it will not be dismissed if the requisite group of shareholders loses the statutory minimum
before the end of the litigation. 26 2 Some of the restrictions on this collective shareholder lawsuit, however, diminish its effectiveness for capital market shareholders. In general, for shareholders to act, they must represent at
least 5% of the company's share capital, a percentage that is gradually
reduced as the company's capital increases over FF 5 million. 263 Moreover,
it is not clear that a successful prosecution or settlement allows the prosecuting shareholder or shareholders to recover legal expenses.
French law does not give directors much control over a derivative suit,
nor does it entitle their views to any special status before the court hearing
the lawsuit. Shareholders must join the corporation as a necessary prosecuting party in the suit, but directors cannot refuse a shareholder request
259. A large shareholder would have more incentive to sue because he or she would
capture more of the gains. It can also be argued that, if the derivative suit improves
corporate governance in general because it puts directors in other firms on notice that
the threat of a lawsuit is real, gains to shareholders cannot be limited to the recovery of
damages for a specific violation in a firm, but rather extend to the improvement in corporate governance in all firms. See, e.g., KLEIN & CoFFEE, supra note 112, at 200.

260. See CoziAN & VIAIER, supra note 98, at 283.
261. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 245, C. soc., supra note 1, at 411-413.
262. See id.
263. See D~cret Na 67-236, art. 200, C. soc., supra note 1, at 666.
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that the company be a plaintiff.2 6 4 Directors cannot dismiss a derivative
suit once it has begun. French law, in fact, declares invalid any clause in a
company's articles of association that requires a prior shareholder resolution to bring a derivative action (or completely renounces their right ever to
bring this kind of action) and further states that the shareholders cannot
265
vote to extinguish a lawsuit.
Under French law, moreover, there are no legal features such as
"demand" and "demand excused," which in the United States give directors
266
considerable power to dismiss derivative complaints that they disfavor.
This may simply reflect the relatively infrequent use of the derivative lawsuit against French directors or officers so far. If, however, shareholders
begin to use this instrument more vigorously to monitor and punish management, managers and directors might lobby for statutory or judicial relief
against these suits. Such relief could take the form of giving them more
control over the actions through such devices as the "demand"
requirement.
B. The French "Direct" Shareholder Lawsuit
A French shareholder also has the right to bring a direct lawsuit, and shareholders can join together to prosecute this suit.2 67 In the direct action, a
shareholder can file a complaint that he or she was individually harmed by
the failure of board members (and others in the company) to provide the
accurate disclosure of a company's financial position as mandated by
French corporate law (a cause of action similar to a securities suit under
section 10(b) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1954).268 If
numerous shareholders were similarly harmed, they could delegate the
right (mandat) to act on their behalf in court, to one or more of them,
provided that the "main plaintiff' receive authorization from each shareholder in writing. Such authorization must identify the mandating shareholder and the number of shares that he or she possessed. 26 9 Again, the
costly nature of such suits undermines their effectiveness.
C. Protection Against Lawsuits For Directors
The above picture is not complete without considering who pays the monetary award assessed against an offending manager or director. If directors
264. See id. art. 201, C. soc., supra note 1, at 666.
265. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 246, C. soc., supra note 1, at 413.
266. Generally, under U.S. corporate law, a shareholder must make "demand" on the
board to determine whether the board wants to proceed with the lawsuit, unless demand
can be "excused" (e.g., when the board is involved in the challenged transaction). If
demand is excused and the shareholder proceeds with the suit, the board still may make
a recommendation to the court concerning the suit, which, if the recommendation is
done properly (through a committee of independent directors), is generally entitled to
considerable deference. See 2 PRINCIPLES, supranote 110, at 55 (discussing the complexity of the demand requirements and jurisprudence thereunder).
267. Shareholders can also act collectively in prosecuting the French "derivative" suit.
268. See Loi N2 66-537, art. 245, C. soc., supra note 1, at 411-13 (noting the possibility of direct and derivative suits); see also SCHOEN, supra note 82, at 187.
269. See D~cret N2 67-236, art. 199, C. soc., supra note 1, at 665-66.
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and managers do not bear the financial burden of monetary penalties, the
corporate governance impact of the legal duties imposed upon them is
somewhat undermined. Yet a successful lawsuit against a director may, for
example, carry a "reputational" penalty even if he or she suffers no financial loss. The issue involves balancing different corporate governance
goals. If financial penalties against management are too draconian, capable persons may decline to accept positions as directors or officers, to take
necessary business risks, or to make useful disclosure, all of which could
hurt the operation and market evaluation of a business thereby producing
negative corporate governance effects.
One possible outcome is for corporate law to allow a corporation to
indemnify or purchase insurance for its directors and officers. Such insurance would cover honest mistakes of judgment, but not intentional misbehavior and self-serving transactions. Persons would not want to occupy
corporate positions unless individual directors or officers were protected in
situations where they had not gained personally and had simply committed errors of judgment, even if somewhat egregious ones. A judgment or
large settlement to recover monies lost by a corporation could seriously
impair or wipe out the assets of even a wealthy individual. With insurance,
moreover, a corporation, and indirectly its shareholders, does not have to
bear the entire cost of officer or director negligence, because the risk of
misfeasance is spread among all corporations as a cost of doing business.
Directors and officers in France can obtain insurance policies for most
civil penalties assessed against them, except for those arising from fraudulent conduct or from intentional misbehavior. 270 Yet, there seem to be no
provisions under French law that allow a company to indemnify directors
for adverse judgments, lawsuit expenses, or settlements. This result is not
surprising. There have been relatively few lawsuits in France from capital
market shareholders, as there were few such shareholders and large controlling shareholders had other ways of disciplining management. Thus,
management and directors had little need for protection against lawsuits
and large judgment awards.
D. Summary
The existence of collective direct shareholder suits, the constraints on the
board's ability to dismiss derivative suits, and the limited protection of
directors from significant monetary penalties suggest that at least the letter
of French law gives complaining shareholders some power to prosecute
lawsuits against directors and management in France. Yet these lawsuits
are infrequent and, as a result, have not had much corporate governance
effect, positive or negative. This lack of utility may be partly due to both
the requirement that 5% of shareholders join the suit and the uncertainty
as to the recovery of plaintiffs' expenses. Moreover, it appears that there is
no group of French lawyers who specialize in such lawsuits, and who
would have an economic incentive to bring them and lobby for legal devel270. See GIBIRI.A, supra note 123, at 433.
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opments to make them easier and less costly to pursue. There is no clear
explanation for this social phenomenon, although the "closed" nature of
the French financial and legal communities along with the fear of social
exclusion and ostracism from undertaking an activity not favored by the
"group" may offer some justification.2 7 1 Where a group shareholder
action has emerged, it has been through associations of small shareholders
that act on their own behalf and that have not developed a large "plaintiffs
2 72
bar" to support them.
However, the situation may be changing. There are a few lawyers in
the French financial and legal community, generally with foreign training,
who are beginning to experiment with the legal possibilities of French corporate law for collective action purposes. 273 While creating an "industry"
from which they benefit (much the same way that U.S. plaintiffs' lawyers
do), they appear so far to have limited their representation to large minority
shareholders, choosing not to stray from the accepted norms of appropriate behavior in the French business and legal community. It remains to be
seen whether success and the entry into the French capital market of more
non-French investors will cause these new lawyers/businessmen further to
develop lawsuits and related legal techniques as an important corporate
274
governance device.
If, moreover, French corporate law is reformed in accordance with the
suggestions of Senator Marini, there may well be more shareholder suits.
Marini believes that the monitoring of directors and management through
criminal sanctions (one of the main forms of oversight in France) must give
way to direct shareholder action, including shareholder lawsuits. 275 He
even recommends that judges receive increased training in economics and
finance because of the likelihood that (if the reform occurs) they will hear
more cases involving shareholder and management disputes. 2 76 In one
respect, however, his reform proposal is hostile to collective shareholder
271. In the United States, it is probably fair to say that the plaintiffs' bar which specialized in such suits and many of the legislators and judges who favored their legal
development first came from ethnic groups (e.g., Jews and Italians) that were traditionally excluded from other financial work. Cf., RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAwYERs IN THE NEw DEAL (1995). The absence of a similar bar in France
may owe something to the absence of a clearly defined "outcast" group among the business bar that needs to find a source of livelihood.
272. Specifically notable are the Association nationaledes actionnairesfran~aisand the
Association de defense des intgrets des actionnaires minoritaires.
273. The most well-known of this small group would be Sophie L'H&lias of Franklin
Global Investments, a bilingual lawyer with both French and U.S. legal and business
school training. See Fair Shares, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 65 (discussing her
activity).
274. See generally Fanto, Transformationof French CorporateGovernance, supra note 2,
at 22-28.
275. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 87.
276. See id. at 124. This Article has mentioned only in passing the French court
system and its availability to hear commercial law disputes. Suffice it to say that basic
shareholder disputes are heard by a tribunalde commerce, with the possibility of appeal
to the Cour d'appel and ultimately to the Cour de cassation. See generally CHRSTIAN
DADOMo & SusAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 60-63, 82-89 (2d ed. 1996).
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legal action because he opposes France's adoption of the "class action"
mechanism, whereby an attorney can receive a contingency fee for representation of a large group of similarly situated shareholders in a successful
lawsuit.2 77 One could criticize this opposition to collective shareholder
action in lawsuits because capital market shareholders must join together
in these actions for practical economic reasons. 27 8 Nonetheless, the overall
thrust of his proposal is to facilitate shareholder suits.
It is important to mention here the role of French criminal law in monitoring corporate agents. As Senator Marini has observed, French corporate law is extremely criminalized: a director's violations of duties may
well subject him or her to criminal penalties. 2 79 This made sense in the
context of State ownership and control of enterprises, for violation of
almost any corporate law could conceivably implicate State interests and
justify a criminal penalty. 280 In fact, criminal penalities are one of the
major ways in which the State punishes violations by its agents who
directed and managed its corporations. Yet, with privatization and the
increased number of capital market shareholders in France, it is necessary
to distinguish those obligations that a civil action by interested parties
could appropriately enforce from the few that implicate societal interests in
such a way as to demand criminal sanctions. This is a delicate reform in
France as numerous management abuses in French companies might suggest a continuing need for criminal actions, 2 8 ' and the newly privatized
companies are not yet prepared to control their corporate agents without
the help of dominant shareholders (which might in fact explain these
abuses). The Marini Report recommends limiting the scope of criminal
sanctions to serious, intentional and fraudulent violations of corporate law,
such as those involving misstating company accounts, abuses in stock issuance, serious hindrance of shareholders' information and voting rights,
and self-interested transactions. It also suggests developing civil actions
for the parties harmed through other failures by management and directors
to fulfill their legal obligations. 282 If the reform becomes law, a new era
may begin for French shareholder lawsuits.
277. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 96. Marini does not recommend adoption of
the contingency fee arrangement in France because of the problems that have appeared
with it in the United States. Id.
278. Marini favors collective action in other contexts, such as voting.
279. For a brief summary of financial and corporate crimes, see Claude DucoulouxFavard, Dlits financiers et boursiers, Dic-ioNNm PMNNT EPARGNE Er PRODUITS FINANcIERs, Mar. 15, 1995, § 53.
280. See Bernard Bouloc, Le droit penal des socigtts, in MODEISATION DU DRorr, supra
note 80, at 69-73 (describing the evolution of the criminalization of French corporate
law largely as arising out of State responses to scandals concerning public companies).
281. See France: Who's next?, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1996, at 48 (discussing French
company executives and politicians subject to criminal proceedings).
282. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 106-10. Professor Bouloc cautions that the
Marini Report's effort to decriminalize corporate law will be difficult since, even if statutory criminal violations are eliminated, common law criminal violations will remain.
See Bouloc, supra note 280, at 73-78.
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Conclusion
This Article has considered how well French legal policy-makers have
adapted French corporate law to promote market capitalism. It generally
concludes that, in many cases, French law provides protection for these
shareholders, but that the law is often of recent origin or not yet adequately
developed and rarely used. This state of affairs makes sense: market capitalism, while not new in France, has only recently become more important
as the State abandons its role in the capitalization of major corporations.
The growth of corporate governance within French law is most visible in
the area of securities law where, for the past two decades, French legal
policy-makers have been trying to provide French capital market investors
with protections similar to those in traditional capital market systems to
which investors are accustomed. As French capital-raising increasingly
emphasizes stock market funding and as State monitoring of management
decreases, French corporate and securities law will play a more critical role
in French corporate governance than it has previously done. Even if family
control, in the absence of State ownership, assumes a larger role in France,
such firms will still need capital market investors for additional financing
and thus have to ensure that the corporate governance system protects
these investors.
One could hardly talk about legal reform in French corporate governance without discussing the Vienot Report, which this Article has occasionally cited. The Report shows that some important French business and
legal practitioners believe that French corporate law must be targeted to
counter the current weakness of capital market shareholders in the face of
management power. Nearly all of its recommendations have this purpose. 28 3 Although the Vinot Report does not suggest any concrete legal
reforms to French law, it attempts to reinvigorate the board of directors
through informal recommendations that would make board members take
their duties more seriously. This orientation makes sense in a new finance
situation where capital market investors must rely upon the board to protect their interests. The Vi~not Report recommends the following: all
boards have at least two independent members (without ties or other links
to the company); special board committees should be created to deal with
such critical subjects as audit, compensation, and board nomination (all of
which go to the heart of supervising management activities and should
thus include outside directors as members); and board members should
not only take seriously their legal duties (to be informed about company
matters and to avoid conflicts of interest), but they also should be in a
better position to fulfill them (such as having enhanced rights of access to
company information). The Report urges boards to provide shareholders
with more information about their activities and the company's operations
283. For discussions and evaluations of the report, see, for example, Daniel Hurstel &
Thomas Bieder, Est-il urgent et indispensablede reformer le droit des societes au nom de la
"corporategovernance"? 113 REVUE DES Socitr.s 633 (1995); Alice Pezard, A propos du
Rapport Vidnot sur le gouvernement d'entreprise, inRAPPORT MoRAL, supra note 61, at
197.
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in order to increase shareholder involvement in critical company decisions.
Together, these recommendations are designed to improve the monitoring
ability of capital market investors themselves.
Yet the Vi~not Report is somewhat schizophrenic. From the perspective of market capitalism, improvements to board structure and behavior
are designed to enhance the monitoring of managers by directors (the primary agents working for the shareholders) and thus to curb managers'
power and prevent their inevitable domination of the board. Nowhere,
however, does the Report specifically acknowledge this purpose and logic
or explain that its reforms are based upon this agency framework. Rather,
the Vi~not Report emphasizes that French corporate law is founded upon a
different theoretical basis - that the board serves company, not shareholder, interests.2 84 From an agency perspective which focuses on countering management power, this justification simply invites managers to
"divide and conquer": rather than serving company interests, executives
can pit various company constituents (such as creditors, employees and
shareholders) against one another to maintain their own primacy. One is,
therefore, left wondering about the purpose behind the "voluntary"
reforms proposed by the Vinot Report if, as it appears, they do not rely on
an agency justification.
The Vi~not Report's recommendations are presented as clarifying the
flexibility of French company law and its board structure for investors
unfamiliar with them and as improving board behavior in a minor way. 28 5

Taking a cynical view, the Report could be seen as acknowledging the
power of international and primarily Anglo-Saxon institutional investors (it
was released in French and in English) without recommending any fundamental changes to the French system.28 6 If, moreover, the State continues
to influence significantly large firms or if many firms fall under family
284. See Vi~not Report, supra note 2, at 2 ("This framework is rooted in a principle
which the Committee considers essential, namely that whatever a board's membership
and proceduresmay be, its members collectively represent all shareholdersand it must at all
times put the company's interestsfirst."). Professor Alain Couret explains well this intellectual foundation of French company law. See Alain Couret, Chronique: Le gouvernement d'entreprise: la corporategovernance, 22 RECUEIL DALLOZ SiREY 163, 165 (1995).
285. See Vi~not Report, supra note 2, at 1.
Privatization and the growing presence of non-resident investors on the Paris
stock market has led to the rapid emergence of a new type of shareholder with
little knowledge of the rules and practices applied by the boards of directors of
listed companies in France. Such shareholders have naturally sought
clarification.
Id.
286. A cynic might also suggest that, since U.S. scholars and practitioners produced
their "Principles of Corporate Governance" and their U.K. counterparts their "Cadbury
Report," the French felt obligated to do the same, without acknowledging that they were
simply following an Anglo-Saxon model (thus, the briefness of the Vi~not Report). Olivier PastrE observes that the drafters of the Vi~not Report were responding to the con-

cerns of non-French institutional investors. See PastrY, supra note 60, at 203.
The Commission des Operations de Bourse has done much to publicize in France
developments in U.S. and U.K. corporate governance. See, e.g., MARIE-No L.E DOMPf &
COB: THE POWERS IN THE ENTREISE (1994); Bulletin
COB, oct.-d~c. (1994) (discussing ALI Principles and Cadbury Report). See also Andr6
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control, recommendations to enhance capital market investor power are
likely to be muted. A more charitable view of the Vinot Report's approach
is that it advocates informal corporate governance reforms because its
drafters realized that change in this area (which could lead to serious
restructuring of French industry) is likely to be a highly charged political
subject. Furthermore, from an agency perspective, a complete U.S.-style
system of corporate governance is not needed where counterweights to
management, such as families and continued State influence, exist.
Any French legal reform promoting a corporate governance system
protective of capital market investors requires serious reconsideration of
the foundations of French corporate and securities law and of French corporate governance in general. This is not to say that French law is now
inflexible or that it requires major changes to accommodate market capitalism, whose growth French law is clearly facilitating. Like the drafters of
the Vinot Report, French corporate law scholars have shown that this law
has little difficulty embracing many of the reforms (examples include use
of independent directors and specialized board committees) proposed in
2 87
Anglo-Saxon countries to improve the monitoring ability of directors.
Yet without reconsidering and possibly reformulating the basis of the law,
any reforms will work counter to other sections of the corporate code. If
more French corporate governance disputes come to the courts, judges will
also have considerable difficulty developing a jurisprudence out of statutory provisions that have no unified intellectual perspective. 2 88
This Article has also referred to Senator Marini's proposal on the
reform of French corporate law.2 89 More important than the Marini
Report's specific proposals is the overall spirit of the proposed reform
which clearly supports market capitalism. The Report observes that AngloSaxon and German legal traditions have influenced French corporate law
(perhaps, as France turned to one or the other as a political ally). 290 The
German influence prevailed in the major 1966 reform of French corporate
law, and this result adversely affected the law's utility to business under the
Tunc, Le governement des socidtes anonymes: le mouvement de reforme aux Etats-Unis et
au Royaume-Uni, 46 R.I.D.C. 59 (1994).
287. See, e.g., Paul Le Cannu, Ldgitimit du pouvoir et efficacite du contrOle dans les
socigtes par actions, BULLETIN JOLY, juillet 1995, at 637; Nathalie Dion, Corporategovernance et socidtds franaises, EDITION DU JURIS-CLASSEUR, DROIT DES Socitrps, juillet-aoiat
1995, at 8.
288. See PastrE, supra note 60, at 205 (noting the increased power of judges in French
corporate governance and their need for a more sustained economic formation).
289. See Marini Report, supra note 2. Many of the reforms proposed by Senator
Marini have been suggested by other commissions or groups studying French corporate
law. See id. at 6 (listing previous reform suggestions). See also CONSEIL NATIONAL DU
PATRONAT FRANcAIs, POUR UNE RtFORME EN PROFONDEUR Du DROIT DES SocI-rLs (juillet

1996) (proposing many corporate law reforms that the Marini Report adopted). Such
reforms are unlikely to proceed quickly, however, now that a Socialist majority has
taken control of the French government.
290. This is a common observation in French business and legal circles. See, e.g.,
ALBERT, supra note 62, at 263-87 (discussing France as something of a battleground
between the German and Anglo-Saxon approaches to company management).
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current capital-driven economic circumstances. 29 1 That influence supported the "institutional" nature of the corporation (particularly the large
corporation), which in turn promoted State ownership and control of large
enterprises that typified the post-war years and which privileged social purposes and other constituencies in an enterprise over its shareholders.
According to the Marini Report, this view of the corporation as an institution exemplifies the "Statist" character of, and thus rigidity in, legal obligations and relationships arising under French corporate law: it observes
that this law "demeure contraignant, tr~s fortement impr~gn d'ordre
29 2
public."
The Marini Report argues that French corporate law must move away
from this Statist approach and return to one that is compatible with the
Anglo-Saxon perspective. Itexplains that enterprise adaptability to current
economic circumstances demands this transformation. The institutional
or Statist approach to corporate law no longer works; rather, it fails to contribute to such adaptability, as the State recedes from its position in the
economy and the capital of large corporations. Because of the rigidity of
Statist corporate law, not only do enterprises fail to adapt readily to changing economic circumstances, but managerial agents, no longer checked by
State controls and increasingly operating in market capitalism, can now
use the "intr&tsocial" strategically to pursue their own interests, generally
at shareholders' expense. 293 Such adverse effects of the Statist approach
have serious consequences because French companies must compete for
investors in the French and global product and capital markets and
because law plays a role in this competition, particularly by encouraging
capital market investing. If, therefore, corporate law handicaps French
enterprises, especially in their capital raising, France and French enter2 94
prises will suffer in global competition.
The main purposes of the Marini Report are, therefore, to simplify
French corporate law (by eliminating its numerous rigidities and formalities that are costly to enterprises and that owe their origin to the Statist
291. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 5.
292. See id. at 18 (noting that the law "remains constraining, very strongly marked by

the public order") (translation by author).
293. See id. at 8-9.
294. See id. at 17.
Par ailleurs, on ne peut m~cornaitre que la competition economique met egalement en concurrence les systtmesjuridiques. De ce point de vue, la lourdeur et les
rigidites du droit frangais des socitEs constituent un handicap. Parmi les elements pris en consideration dans le choix du pays d'accueil d'une societe commerciale, nul doute que la facult6 d'adaptation de l'instrument juridique aux
besoins sp~cifiques de l'entreprise et aux modifications de l'environnement
6conomique et social soit un facteur important.
Id. The author translates the previous passage to state: Moreover, one cannot fail to
recognize that economic competition also puts legal systems in competition. From this perspective, the heaviness and rigidity of French corporate law is a handicap. Among the

elements that a firm takes into consideration is its choice of a country in which to
locate, as there is no doubt that the adaptability of a country's laws to the specific needs
of business and to changes in the economic and social circumstances is an important
factor.
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approach), to give businesses more choice in their use of the corporate
form, and to enhance shareholder rights. In other words, the shift to an
Anglo-Saxon model means making French corporate law contractual, flexible, and friendly to capital market investors. 295 Parties should find in corporate law legal mechanisms that they can adjust to their circumstances,
which will in turn enable them to adapt their business relations (for example, shareholder/management relations) better to the economic situation
2 96
facing them. This approach, well-known to U.S. business law scholars,
considers corporate law as enabling, that is, as providing default rules for a
contract (rules between shareholders and their agents), and as occasionally
mandatory where needed to resolve certain structural abuses in contractual
relationships. 29 7 In its approach, the Marini Report looks to laws in other
countries (particularly Anglo-Saxon ones), especially those concerning
basic shareholder/management relations, which provide the substance of
corporate governance. Because Anglo-Saxon investors are increasingly
present in the capital of French companies, hold approximately one-third
of this capital, and are familiar with this contractual focus, the potential
2 98
use of these laws is not surprising.
Much more than the Vi~not Report, Senator Marini offers a reconceptualization of French corporate law that is sensitive to, and explicitly
acknowledges, changing corporate governance in France and the evolving
nature of agency problems in that country's large enterprises. Yet it is
unlikely that any reformulation of French corporate law will result in a
wholesale adoption of an Anglo-American style market capitalism. A reformulation and reconsideration of the foundations and function of French
corporate law and governance may reveal that the historical "weight"
accorded to some current French corporate governance practices will prevent them from being easily changed. As some have observed,2 99 strong
management in French companies has historically served certain pur295. See id. at 17 ("Ces considErations militent en faveur de sa simplification et, plus
encore, de sa contractualisation.Mais ce qui justifie fondamentalement cette d~marche,
c'est le constat de la tr~s grande diversite des projets des cr~ateurs d'entreprise et de
leurs besoins."). The author translates the previous passage to state: These considerations argue in favor of [the law's] simplification and even more, of its contextualization.
But what fundamentally justifies this effort is the observation that there is a very great

diversity of projects and needs of entrepreneurs.

296. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 132, at 1-39.
297. See Marini Report, supra note 2, at 9.

En effet, la socit6 est d'abord une technique d'organisation juridique des
entreprises. Celles-ci doivent pouvoir trouver dans le droit non pas des entraves,
mais les outils necessaires a leur d~veloppement. La loi doit donc mettre Aleur
disposition des formes sociales aussi souples que possible tout en garantissant
la scuritE juridique des salaries, des cr~anciers et des clients. Son r6le est
moins d'interdire que de permettre.
Id. The author translates the previous passage to state: In effect, the corporation is first
a legal way of organizing firms. They must be able to find in the law, not obstacles, but
the tools necessary for their development. The law must therefore make available to
them corporate forms as flexible as possible while guaranteeing the legal security of the
employees, creditors and customers. [The law's] role is less to prohibit than to permit.
298. See id. at 6.
299. See PAsTRE, supra note 60, at 204; Tunc, supra note 216, at 72.
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poses, such as providing a necessary alternative to an ineffectual board or
to one dominated by conflicting interests. The primary focus of a corporate board on company interests not only has a powerful intellectual foundation in the institutional theory of the corporation, but, since it also
allows the board to consider interests beyond those of shareholders, it
could be, and has been, used in particular economic circumstances to promote social harmony. As noted earlier, 30 0 the French State has been very
involved in large enterprises, and the noyaux durs organized around financial institutions may simply be an indirect continuation of this phenomena. Moreover, family capitalism, even on a large scale, has been, and
remains, important (a phenomenon that Senator Marini does not directly
address). A reaffirmation and the continued existence of capitalist systems
other than market capitalism in French economic life may undermine or
limit legal reforms useful for capital market shareholders.
Legal reforms of French corporate governance are therefore daunting,
not only because French corporate governance is evolving, but also
because few studies exist on the nature of this system and its evolution. In
such circumstances, Olivier PastrY's admonition rings true: a thorough
national analysis of French corporate governance is necessary and such
analysis must involve different disciplines and approaches. 30 1 Only this
kind of reflection can intelligently guide legal reform. The analysis will not
be easy, not only because of its complexity, but also because it will bring to
the forefront competing groups who stand to gain by the triumph of one or
another form of corporate governance. 30 2 As in all human endeavors,
whatever emerges from the analysis will be the result of compromise and
the relative power, whether intellectual or other, French or non-French, of
those involved in the debate. Yet without a sustained French public analysis and discussion, French corporate governance will be shaped largely
away from the public's eyes, and valuable alternatives and solutions, which
might have surfaced and even prevailed in an open debate, may never come
to light.

300. See supra Part II.
301. See PastrY, supra note 60, at 201-03. This is not to suggest that none of this work
has been done. One has only to think of the writings (many of which have been cited
herein) by Bauer, Le Cannu, Morin, PastrE, Thiveaud and Tunc, to name just a few.
There is simply more work needed. See also GPRARD CHARuEAux, ED., LE GouvERNaMENT
DEs ErrnzapisEs: CORORATE GOVERNANCE THtoluas Er FaTs (1997) (finance articles on
French corporate governance).
302. See generally YvEs DEzuLY, MARCHANDS DE DROIT: LA RESTRUCTURATION DE
L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL PAR LES MULTINATIONALES DU DRoIT (1992).

